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ABSTRACT

The fiscal policy-money supply relationship is examined
within the context of a small structural model of the economy.

The

Federal Reserve is assumed to act as though it minimizes a static
quadratic loss function subject to its perception of the structure
of the economy.

The loss function contains as arguments the weighted

squared deviations of actual from desired values for real GNP, the
inflation rate, a balance-of-trade measure, and a short-term interest
rate.

The first three arguments represent macroeconomic concerns of

the Federal Reserve and the last argument is employed as a proxy for
Federal Reserve concern with financial market stability.-

The macro-

economic model employed as a proxy for the Federal Reserve's percep
tion of the structure of the economy is a linear variant of the
IS-LM model that incorporates endogenous net taxes, an endogenous
wealth measure, inflationary expectations, and budget constraints
for both the fiscal and monetary authorities.
The solution to this constrained optimization problem yields
a policy reaction function that relates the Federal Reserve's policy
variable - unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve requirement
changes - to desired values of the arguments in the loss function
and to lagged endogenous and exogenous variables of the model, which
include two fiscal variables.

The coefficients on the exogenous

ix

fiscal variables in this equation are analyzed to determine the
expected effect of these variables on the Federal Reserve's policy
variable.

These coefficients are complex mixtures of the structural

parameters and weights in the loss function.

Given widely held

expectations about the signs of the structural parameters, the
expected signs on the fiscal variables depend upon the relative
weights in the loss function.

It is shown that if the weight on

the financial market stability proxy exceeds a weighted sum of the
weights on the macroeconomic variables in the loss function, then
the expected signs on federal expenditures and exogenous federal net
taxes are positive and negative respectively.

Coefficients of these

signs thus indicate accommodation of fiscal policy by the Federal
Reserve.
To determine the anticipated effect of the fiscal policy
variables upon the money supply, the reaction function is added to
structural model and the reduced form money supply equation is
derived.

It is shown that accommodation of fiscal policy by the

Federal Reserve is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the
reduced form coefficients on expenditures and net taxes to be posi
tive and negative, respectively.
To empirically test the direction of effect of fiscal policy
upon the monetary policy variable and the money supply, the IS-LM
model, with and without the reaction function, is estimated over
the period 1953-1976 utilizing three-stage least squares.
estimated coefficients on federal

The

expenditures and exogenous federal

net taxes in the reaction function are positive and negative,
respectively, thereby suggesting that within the same quarter the
Federal Reserve accommodates expansionary fiscal policy.

The signs

of these coefficients thus imply that the Federal Reserve weights
financial market stability more heavily than the macroeconomic
stabilization goals.

However, it should be noted that while within

the same quarter financial market stability seems to dominate other
goods, Federal Reserve behavior is significantly influenced by
these other goods.
Solution of the models for the reduced form money supply
equations reveals that the coefficients on the fiscal variables in
these equations are positive for federal expenditures and negative
for net taxes.

However, the coefficients for the model without the

reaction function are substantially smaller than for the model with
the reaction function.

These results suggest that failure to con

sider the response of the Federal Reserve to fiscal policy leads
to underestimates of the effects of fiscal variables upon the money
supply.

xi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A recent development in theoretical and empirical macro
economics - the rise of monetarism - has stimulated interest in
the role of money in the economy.

Monetarists have asserted the

primacy of the causal role of money in determining the level of
output and prices.

In describing the emphasis of the monetarist

approach to macroeconomics, one prominent monetarist, Milton
Friedman, has declared:

"I regard the description of our position

as 'money is all that matters for changes in nominal income and
for short-run changes in real income' as an exaggeration but one
that gives the right flavor of our conclusions.""*'

The primacy of

the causal role of money has been much debated in recent years,

and

while many mainstream non-monetarists have not denied a significant
role to money, one leading non-monetarist, Franco Modigliani, has
suggested that "we are all monetarists now" in the sense that most

Friedman, "A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis,"
in R. J. Gordon, ed., Milton Friedman's Monetary Framework: A
Debate with His Critics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974), p. 27.

2
This debate has theoretical and empirical elements.
For
a good summary of both of these elements, see A. S. Blinder and R. M.
Solow, "Analytical Foundations of Fiscal Policy," in A. S. Blinder
and R. M. Solow, et a l . , The Economics of Public Finance (Washington
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 57-78.

1

2

economists now believe that the money stock has an important effect
upon the level of output and prices.

q

Although a great deal of research effort has been invested
in studies of the effect of money

on the economy, relatively little

effort has been invested in examining the underlying determinants of
changes in the money stock.

Typically the level or rate of change in

the money stock has been taken as exogenous in studies which address
the economic effects of changes in the money stock.

As noted by

R. J. Gordon:

In addition to their lack of investment of research
effort in the short-run dynamics of wage and price
adjustment, monetarist authors have been slow to shift
their attention from the role of money as the basic
determinant of income and price changes to the more
^
fundamental underlying determinants of changes in money.

The debate over the role of money in the economy has been
accompanied by a debate over the efficacy of fiscal policy in altering
the level of output and prices.

Some monetarists have denied any

significant fiscal policy effects upon real output unless the fiscal
policy actions are accompanied by changes in the money stock.

For

example, one monetarist, David Fand, has written:

^F. Modigliani, "The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We
Forsake Stabilization Policies?," American Economic Review, 67, 2
(March 1977), p. 1.
^R. J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in the Theory of Infla
tion and Unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economies, 2, 2 (April,
1976), p. 198.

3

To the monetarist, the impact of fiscal actions will depend
curcially on how the government deficit is financed: expen
ditures financed either by taxing or borrowing involve a
transfer of resources (from the public to the government),
with both interest rates and wealth effects on private
portfolios, but the net effect of a temporary change in
fiscal policy on spending may be ambiguous... . On the
other hand, if the deficit is financed through money creation
by the banking system — if the deficit is monetized — the
effect is unambiguously expansionary.^

While many non-monetarists would agree that fiscal actions financed
through money creation are more expansionary than fiscal actions
financed through taxation or issuance of bonds, few would assert no
significant effects from tax or bon financed actions.^

The simula

tion of large scale models of the economy has provided empirical
support for significant fiscal policy effects upon real output,
although the magnitude of the effects varies with the mode of finan
cing the fiscal action.

In terms of total effects, money financed

D. I. Fand, "Some Issues in Monetary Economics: Fiscal
Policy Assumptions and Related Multipliers," in T. M. Havrilesky and
J . T . Boorman, eds., Current Issues in Monetary Theory and Policy
(Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1976),
p. 233.
^See for example, W. H. Branson, Macroeconomic Theory and
Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 278-96.
It should be
noted that in a long-run theoretical context, Blinder and Solow
have demonstrated that under some conditions, the long-run mul
tiplier for bond financed fiscal actions is greater than for money
financed fiscal actions.
See A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, "Does
Fiscal Policy Matter?," Journal of Public Economies, 2, 4 (November
1973), pp. 319-37.

4

fiscal actions ranks first, followed respectively by bond financed
and tax financed fiscal actions.^
While much research effort has been invested in separate
studies of monetary and fiscal policies, relatively little effort has
been devoted to the study of the relationship between monetary and
fiscal policies.

Macroeconomic models have been constructed that

include a budget constraint for the government, an innovation that

g
does link monetary and fiscal policies.

The budget constraint

reflects the necessity for a fiscal policy action to be financed in
some manner - through taxation, the sale of securities to the public,

^See for example, N. N. Choudhry, "Integration of Fiscal and
Monetary Sectors in Econometric Models: A Survey of Theoretical
Issues and Empirical Findings," International Monetary Fund Staff
Papers, 23, 2 (July 1976), pp. 424-33 and F. Modigliani and A. Ando,
"Impacts of Fiscal Actions on Aggregate Income and the Monetarist
Controversy: Theory and Evidence," in J. L. Stein, ed., Monetarism
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.), pp. 17-42.
^Models with a budget constraint are described in:
C. F.
Christ, "A Simple Macroeconomic Model with a Government Budget
Restraint," Journal of Political Economy, 76, 1 (January/February
1968) pp. 53-67; Blinder and Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter?,"
pp. 112-27; E. F. Infante and J. L. Stein, "Does Fiscal Policy
Matter?," Journal of Monetary Economics, 4, 2(November 1976), pp.
473-500; A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Still
Matter?," Journal of Monetary Economies, 4, 2(Noveraber 1976), pp. 50110; C. F. Christ, "Some Dynamic Theory of Macroeconomic Policy Effects
on Income and Prices Under the Government Budget Restraint," Journal
of Monetary Economics, 4, l(January, 1978), pp. 45-70; and B. Hansen,
"On the Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Taxonomic Discus
sion," American Economic Review, 63, 4(September 1973), pp. 546-71.
With the exception of Hansen, these studies assume the
authority for both monetary and fiscal policymaking resides in
one political unit - the government. As noted by Hansen this
assumption does not fit the institutional reality of U.S. policy
making in the post-Accord period.

5

or through an increase in the monetary base.

These models thus allow

the analysis of fiscal policy actions under different assumptions
about the financing of the policy change.

For example, these models

permit the analysis of the output and price effects of, say, an
expansionary fiscal action under the assumption that the policy move
is financed by an increase in the monetary base.
While the budget constraint models allow the study of the
relationship between fiscal and monetary policies under alternative
assumptions about the financing of a fiscal policy change, these
models do not provide any insight into the reaction of the monetary
authorities to a particular fiscal policy action when the authority
for fiscal and monetary policies resides in different decision making
entities.

This institutional arrangement, of course, characterizes

the formulation of monetary and fiscal policies in the United States.
In this institutional setting fiscal policymakers have only two
direct means of financing a deficit - taxation or sale of securities
to the public.

Neither of these two modes of finance has any sigQ

nificant direct effects upon the monetary base or the money stock.
A relationship between fiscal and monetary policies is often asserted,
but is seldom systematically analyzed.

For example, Fand asserts:

"Fiscal deficits are obviously often associated with, if not directly

g

For a detailed discussion of this point see Chapter III of
this study.

responsible for, substantial increases in the monetary aggregates.""^®
(My emphasis added.)

Fand does not, however, explain how the deficit

leads directly to the increase in the monetary aggregates.
In the case of the United States, some analysts contend that
because of an over-riding concern by the Federal Reserve to stabilize
interest rates in the short-run an expansionary fiscal policy leads
more or less mechanically to an increase in the money supply.

In this

view an expansionary fiscal policy action results in a budget deficit
which must be financed through issuance of government securities.

The

sale of these securities to the private sector puts upward pressure
upon market interest rates.

This upward pressure is countered by

Federal Reserve purchases of outstanding government securities thereby
monetizing, at least in part, the debt issued to finance the deficit.
Thus because of the effect of fiscal policy and its financing upon
interest rates, the Federal Reserve, according to this view, accom
modates expansionary fiscal policy by engaging in open market opera
tions that expand the money s u p p l y . ^
The suggestion that the primary goal of the Federal Reserve
is interest rate stabilization is extreme.

Certainly the Federal

Reserve proclaims a wider range of goals than just interest rate
stabilization.

Examination of the minutes of the Federal Open Market

^®Fand, "Some Issues," p. 234.
^ F o r an example of this approach see D. R. Francis, "How and
Why Fiscal Actions Matter to a Monetarist," Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Review, 56, 5 (May 1974), pp. 4-7.

7

Committee meetings and the annual reports of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System reveals stated concerns with the growth
of real output, the rate of unemployment, the price of inflation, the
repercussions of international economic events upon the U.S. economy,
and financial market stability (often concern with fluctuations in
interest rates is taken as a proxy for concern for financial market
stability).

12

In addition, studies which have estimated policy

reaction functions for the Federal Reserve have concluded that Federal
Reserve policy actions reflect a significant concern for macroeconomic
stabilization goals as well as the financial market stability goal.

12

See any issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
issue of the Annual Report of the Board of Governors of
Reserve System (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of
Reserve System).

13

(Washington,
or any recent
the Federal
the Federal

■^See for example, J. H. Wood, "A Model of Federal Reserve
Behavior," in G. Horwich, ed., Monetary Process and Policy (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1967), pp. 135-66. T. Havrilesky, "A
Test of Monetary Policy Action," Journal of Political Economy, 75, 3
(June 1967), pp. 299-304; M. W. Reran and C. T. Babb, "An Explana
tion of Federal Reserve Actions (1933-68)," Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Review, 51, 7 (July 1969), pp. 7—20; A. F. Friedlaender,
"Macro Policy Goals in the Postwar Period: A Study in Revealed Pref
erence ," CJ^iarterl^ Journal o £ Economics^ 87, 1 (February 1973), pp.
25-43; R. T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogeniety of Monetary Policy,"
Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2 (July 1974), pp. 175-88; and T. M.
Havrilesky, R. H. Sapp, and R. L. Schweitzer, "Tests of the Federal
Reserve’s Reaction to the State of the Economy 1964-74," Social
Science Quarterly, 55, 4 (March 1975), pp. 835-52.

8

Theoretical analyses of the fiscal-monetary policy relation
ship which begin from the premise that the dominant goal of the
Federal Reserve is interest rate stabilization bias the conclusion

*

of the analysis toward acceptance of monetary accommodation of fiscal
policy.

This bias will be examined in more detail in a later chapter,

but a simple example will illustrate the source of this bias.

Suppose

the Federal Reserve has two concerns - one is interest rate stabiliza
tion and the other is the inflation rate.

Suppose now that the fiscal

authorities initiate an expansionary policy action which is successful
in stimulating aggregate demand.

This fiscal policy move will tend to

raise both the inflation rate and the interest rate.

If Federal

Reserve concern with inflation is sufficiently greater than its
concern with interest rate stabilization, the Federal Reserve will
take policy actions which will lower the money supply, a policy course
that will reinforce the initial upward pressure on interest rates.
On the other hand, if interest rate stabilization dominates over the
concern for inflation, the Federal Reserve will take actions that
will expand the money supply and thereby reinforce the pressure on
the inflation rate.
In one set of circumstances the Federal Reserve acted to
blunt the stimulative effects of the fiscal action, but in the other
case the Federal Reserve acted to reinforce (accommodate) the fiscal
action.

Thus it is seen that concern with inflation relative to

concern with interest rate stabilization determines Federal Reserve

9

response to fiscal policy.

The theoretical analysis of the fiscal-

monetary policy relationship is thus complicated by consideration of
multiple goals for the Federal Reserve.

This simple example is

intended only to illustrate the complications introduced when multiple
goals for the Federal Reserve are considered.

The multiple goal case

will be analyzed rigorously in Chapter IV of this study.
This study analyses the theoretical and empirical relationship
between fiscal policy and the money supply when the Federal Reserve is
assumed to pursue both macroeconomic stabilization goals and the goal
of financial market stabilization.

A linear variant of the IS-LM

macromodel with endogenous taxes, inflationary expectations, and a
government budget constraint is specified and estimated.

14

The effect

of fiscal policy upon the money supply is examined initially under
the presumption that the behavior of the Federal Reserve is exogenous
to the model.

While this assumption is often made, it is tantamount

to suggesting that the Federal Reserve responds only randomly or not
at all to economic events.
The effect of fiscal policy upon the money supply when the
Federal Reserve is assumed to respond systematically to economic
events is next analyzed.

The Federal Reserve is hypothesized to

minimize a quadratic loss function which contains as arguments the
14

While the budget constraint is explicit in the theoretical
model, it is implicit in the estimated model.
For a discussion of
this point see Chapter V of this study.

weighted squared deviations of actual from desired values of real
GNP, an inflation rate, a balance of trade measure, and a short-term
interest rate subject to its perception of the structure of the
\

economy.

The IS-LM model described earlier is employed as a proxy

for the Federal Reserve's perception of the structure of the economy.
The solution to this constrained optimization problem yields a policy
reaction function that relates the Federal Reserve's policy instrument
to desired values of the arguments in the loss function and to exo
genous and lagged endogenous variables in the structural model - which
include the fiscal variables.

Analysis of the coefficients on the

fiscal variables in the reaction function permits specification of
the conditions under which the Federal Reserve can be expected to
accommodate fiscal policy in the sense that an expansionary fiscal
policy will be accompanied by an expansion in the monetary policy
variable.
The model, with the policy reaction function appended, is
estimated by iterative three-stage least squares for the period 195376.

Quarterly data are employed in the estimation.

The estimated

model is then employed to derive numerical estimates of the impact of
fiscal policy upon the money supply.

Analysis of the model also

provides evidence on the Federal Reserve's pursuit of macroeconomic
stabilization goals over this period.

Finally, analysis of the model

provides evidence on the Goldfeld-Blinder argument that model mul
tipliers will be biased if policymakers reacted systematically to the

11

state of the economy over the period of estimation and this systematic
reaction is not explicitly accounted for in the m o d e l . M
The remainder of this study will now be outlined.

Chapter

II contains a review of the literature dealing with the fiscal-monetary
policy relationship.

The IS-LM model is specified and the effects of

fiscal policy upon the money supply when Federal Reserve behavior is
exogenous are analyzed in Chapter III.

The Federal Reserve loss

function is specified and the fiscal policy effects upon the money
supply when Federal Reserve behavior is endogenous are analyzed in
Chapter IV.

Chapter V presents the estimated model and estimates of

the impact multipliers of the fiscal variables upon the money supply.
Chapter VI summarizes the theoretical and empirical results derived
in the previous chapters.

M s . M. Goldfeld and A. S. Blinder, "Some Implications of
Endogenous Stabilization Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 3 (1972), pp. 585-644.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

While little systematic research has been directed toward
analyzing the relationship between fiscal policy and the money
supply, several studies provide some direct or indirect evidence
on this relationship, although with one exception examination of this
relationship was not the principal aim of these studies.

The studies

that will be reviewed in this chapter are those of J. H. Wood, A. F.
Friedlaender, R. T. Froyen, J. A. Cacy, R. J. Gordon, and R. J. Barro.

I.

Wood
The analytic framework utilized in this study is similar to

the framework employed by Wood in a study of Federal Reserve behavior.
Wood assumes that the Federal Reserve attempts to optimize a pref
erence function which contains as arguments the weighted squared
deviations of actual from desired values for the changes in real
GNP, the rate of unemployment, the current surplus in the balance
of payments^and the price level subject to its perception of the
structure of the economy.

The solution to this optimization prob

lem yields an equation - the policy reaction function - that relates

12

13

the Federal Reserve's policy instrument to the exogenous and lagged
endogenous variables of the structural model.^
The structural model employed by Wood is a five equation
model with equations for the changes in real output, the unemploy
ment rate, the current surplus in the balance of payments, the price
level, and the short-term interest rate.

A summary measure of fiscal

policy - the change in the annual cash surplus deflated by the whole
sale price index - appears as an exogenous explanatory variable in
all equations except the interest rate equation.

A measure of the

value of U.S. government securities held by the public appears as an
explanatory variable in the interest rate equation, but there is no
formal link between this variable and the fiscal policy variable.
The Federal Reserve's policy variable - assumed here to be free
reserves adjusted for changes in reserve requirements - appears in
each equation.

2

The final preference function used by Wood differs from the
one described earlier.

The function used in the empirical work

contains two additional terms - the weighted squared short-term
interest rate and the weighted squared volume of Federal Reserve
purchases and sales of government securities adjusted for reserve

■Kj. H. Wood, "A Model of Federal Reserve Behavior," in G.
Horwick, ed., Monetary Process and Policy (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1967), pp. 135-66.
^Wood, "A Model," p. 141.
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requirement changes.

In addition, the empirical function contains

the weighted unemployment rate and the weighted squared price level,
,not the weighted squared differences between actual and desired values
for these variables.

Wood thus assumes in his empirical work that the

desired values for the changes in the price level, the interest rate,
and the volume of securities bought and sold by the Federal Reserve
are zero.

In addition, Wood assumes that the Federal Reserve attempts

to minimize the unemployment rate.
From the preference function and structural model described
above, Wood derives a reaction function which relates the change in
the volume of purchases and sales of government securities by the
Federal Reserve to the exogenous and lagged endogenous variables in
the structural model.

Wood then estimates the reaction function by

ordinary least squares utilizing quarterly data (with the exception
of the fiscal policy measure which

is on an annual basis) for the

period 1952-63.4
Analysis of the coefficients in the estimated reaction function
leads Wood to conclude that the Federal Reserve responds systematically
to changes in real GNP, price level changes, changes in the volume of
government securities held by the public, and changes in the balance
of payments.

The coefficient on the fiscal policy measure is positive,

^Wood, "A Model," p. 149.
4Woo d , "A Model," p. 145-9.
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thereby implying that an expansionary fiscal policy change induces
open market sales which should, ceteris paribus, reduce the money
stock.

However, the coefficient is not statistically significant.^

The use of annual data rather than quarterly data, by suppressing
information about quarter to quarter movements in this variable, may
result in a biased and inconsistent estimate of this coefficient.
Furthermore, it would seem that the change in the volume of govern
ment securities held by the public and the current stance of fiscal
policy would be correlated in any period of time since the financing
of a deficit or surplus affects the volume of securities outstanding.
If this correlation exists, inclusion of both variables in the
reaction function may introduce multicollinearity into the estimation
process.

Finally, the fiscal variable employed in this study may

not be a good measure of the thrust of fiscal policy since it does
not distinguish between policy-induced shifts in expenditures and
tax receipts and changes in these variables resulting from changes
in the level of economic activity.

If the Federal Reserve responds

to the economic effects of fiscal policy, then employment of a
fiscal variable such as the annual cash surplus that does not
accurately measure these economic effects is inappropriate.^

For

5Wood, "A Model," p. 153.
°A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, "Analytical Foundations of
Fiscal Policy," in A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, et al., The Eco
nomics of Public Finance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1974), pp. 3-33.
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these reasons, it is hazardous to infer a positive relationship
between fiscal policy and the monetary policy variable on the basis
of the positive coefficient on the fiscal variable in the reaction
function.
Thus the evidence on the fiscal-monetary policy link provided
by the Wood study must be interpreted cautiously.

The major contri

bution of the Wood study to this study is the suggestion of a general
framework within which the relationship between fiscal policy and
the money supply can be analyzed.

II.

Friedlaender
Friedlaender's study of macro policy goals also provides some

evidence on the empirical relationship between fiscal policy and the
money supply.

Friedlaender's approach to this study is similar to

Wood's study of Federal Reserve behavior.

She assumes that a unified

fiscal and monetary policy authority conducts monetary and fiscal
policy so as to maximize a quadratic preference function subject to
the structure of the economy.

The preference function contains as

arguments the weighted squared deviations of actual from desired
values for the level of real GNP, the unemployment rate, the price
level, the balance of trade, the short-term interest rate, and the
government, budget surplus or deficit.
serves as the structure of the economy.

The FRB-MIT econometric model
From this optimization prob

lem Friedlaender derives and estimates reaction functions for both
monetary and fiscal policy on a quarterly basis for the period
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1954-1964, a period which coincides almost exactly with the period
of Wood's study.^
The difference between actual and desired net free reserves
is employed as the dependent variable in the monetary policy reaction
function.

The coefficient on the fiscal policy variable (the actual

surplus or deficit in the administrative budget) is positive but not
statistically significant, thereby indicating that an increase in the
surplus is associated with an expansion in the gap between actual and
O

desired net free reserves.

The interpretation of this positive sign

is ambiguous for the determination of the effect of fiscal policy
upon the money supply.

The increase in the gap associated with the

rise in the surplus (or a fall in the deficit) could result from
either a reduction in desired net free reserves with actual reserves
constant or falling less than desired net free reserves or it could
result from an expansion in actual net free reserves with desired
reserves constant or rising less than actual net free reserves.

If

the rise in the surplus leads to an increase in desired net free
reserves, monetary policy could be said to be accommodative, in the
sense that the movement in the desired level of net free reserves
is expected to generate economic effects of the same type as the fiscal
action.

On the other hand if the rise in the surplus leads to a
7

A. F. Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals in the Postwar
Period: A Study in Revealed Preference," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 87, 1 (February, 1973), pp. 25-43.
^Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals," p. 36.
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reduction In desired net free reserves, then monetary policy would be
said to be nonaccommodative in the same sense as before.
Thus, the implications of the positive coefficient on the
fiscal variable for the relationship between fiscal policy and the
money supply is ambiguous.

Furthermore, it should be noted that as

in the Wood study, the fiscal variable employed does not distinguish
between discretionary budget changes and budget changes induced by
changes in the level of economic activity.
Finally, it should be noted that Friedlaender assumes that
one authority conducts both monetary and fiscal policy so as to
maximize one preference function.

Given the separate nature of

monetary and fiscal policymaking in the United States after the
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, the assumption of a unified
policy authority does not seem appropriate.

The assumption of one

preference function for both authorities is also inappropriate given
the nature of United States macro policymaking.

There is no reason

that the preference function for both authorities should be.identical,
particularly in light of Federal Reserve concern for financial market
stability.

Even if the preference functions contained the same

variables, there is no inherent reason for the weights on these vari
ables to be identical for the two authorities.

Thus it might be

argued that the Friedlaender framework does not represent the insti
tutional reality of moentary and fiscal policymaking in the period
under study.
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Thus because of the particular measures for fiscal and monetary
policy that are employed in this study, and because of the assumptions
made about the nature of monetary and fiscal policymaking, the empirical
results of this study should be interpreted cautiously.

III.

Froyen
A study of the endogeniety of monetary policy by Froyen also

provides some evidence on the relationship between fiscal and monetary
policy.

Froyen estimates reaction functions for the Federal Reserve

using monthly data over three separate periods of time demarked by
changes in presidental administrations.

The periods for estimation

are February 1953 - January 1961, February 1961 - January 1969, and
February 1969 - December 1972.

Froyen uses two monetary policy vari

ables as the dependent variables in the reaction functions - the
monetary base and the monetary base minus borrowed reserves (hereafter
referred to as the unborrowed monetary base).

The gaps between the

actual and desired unemployment rate, the actual and desired inflation
rate, the actual and desired balance of payments surplus, lagged
values of actual manufacturing and trade sales, the volume of pri
vately held federal debt lagged one month, the change in the long-term
corporate bond rate, and the full-employment surplus lagged one month
are employed as explanatory variables.

Almon lags are used for the

lags on the gaps between the actual and desired unemployment rate, the
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inflation rate, the balance of payments surplus, and on the sales
variable.

o

Froyen suggests that one would expect a negative sign on the
full-employment surplus since monetary policy has tended to accommo
date fiscal policy in the postwar period.

Furthermore, Froyen suggests

that the coefficient on the volume of outstanding federal debt held
by the private sector should be positive because of Federal Reserve
concern for stability in the government securities m a r k e t . ^
The empirical evidence on the effect of fiscal policy upon the
monetary policy

variable

is mixed.

The coefficient on the full-

employment surplus is negative and statistically significant only over
the period February 1961-January 1969.
monetary policy variables.

These results hold for both

In the other two periods, the coefficients

on the fiscal variable are positive but not statistically significant.
The coefficient on the volume of privately held federal debt is
positive in every period but is statistically significant for both
monetary variables only for the period February 1969-December 1972.
The coefficient is significant for the period February 1961-January
1969 only when the monetary base is the dependent v a r i a b l e . ^
9
R. T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogeniety of Monetary Policy,"
Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2 (July 1974), pp. 175-88.
^Froyen, "A Test," p. 178.
■^Froyen, "A Test," p. 182.
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Froyen concludes his study with the observation that macroeconomic stabilization goals have significantly influenced Federal
Reserve behavior in the past.

The fiscal variable employed in this

study is superior to the variables used in the Wood and Friedlaender
studies.

The evidence for the effect of fiscal policy upon the

monetary policy variable is, however, mixed.

The evidence suggests

that in the period February 1961-January 1969 the Federal Reserve
accommodated fiscal policy.

In other periods the evidence is less

suggestive since the coefficients on the fiscal variables are posi
tive but not statistically significant.

IV.

Cacy
The studies discussed up to this point have not focused

directly upon the relationship between fiscal policy and the money
supply.

The evidence these studies have shed on this relationship

has been a by-product of the pursuit of their primary research
interests which varied from study to study.

A study by Cacy has,

however, focused directly upon the fiscal policy-money supply rela
tionship.

Cacy hypothesizes that the levels of certain monetary

variables (M^, M 2 , the monetary base, member bank reserves, and the
volume of U.S. securities held by the Federal Reserve) are affected
by the current and previous federal budget deficits.

Because of

Federal Reserve concern for the effect of financing a deficit upon
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the level of interest rates, Cacy anticipates a positive relation
ship between the monetary variables and the def i c i t . ^
Cacy tests his hypotehsis by regressing the levels of the
monetary variables on a proxy for the deficit, the level of net
liabilities of the Treasury, over the period 1970-74.

Each variable

is seasonally adjusted and detrended, and lags of 18 and 24 months
are employed in the regressions.
sion relation for

Cacy reports a significant regres

with an 18-month lag (adjusted R^ = .28), M£

with both the 18 and 24 month lags (adjusted R s are .40 and .46
respectively), and the monetary base with a 24-month lag (adjusted
o
R

= .58).

However, the sums of the coefficients on net liabilities

in the regressions for M^, M 2 with the 18 month lag, and the monetary
base are negative.

The sum of the coefficients on net liabilities

for M 2 with the 24-month lag is positive.

No significant regression

relation is found for member bank reserves (adjusted R^ = .00).-^
Cacy concludes that the Federal Reserve did not try to
offset the interest rate effects of the budget deficit.

He suggests

that the negative relationships found are due to private sector
response to the deficit.

This conclusion points out the hazards

of estimating and interpreting "reduced form" equations.

In

A. Cacy, "Budget Deficits and the Money Supply,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review, June 1975,
pp. 3-9.
^Cacy,

"Budget Deficits," p. 7.
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another regression Cacy finds a positive relationship between a
short-term interest rate (the commercial paper rate) and the
budget d e ficit.^

Most studies of the money supply relation have

found a positive relation between the level of the money stock
and interest r a t e s . ^

If deficits do lead to interest rate

increases and the response of the public and commercial banks
to this increase results in an expansion of the money supply,
then Cacy's interpretation of the regression results is inappro
priate.

As in many other "reduced form" studies, the interpretation

of the results is made difficult by the lack of specification of
a model of the e c o n o m y . ^
As noted in Chapter IV of this study, a negative relation
ship between fiscal policy and the money supply is expected when
Federal Reserve concern for macroeconomic stabilization goals
dominates its concern for financial market stability.

If this

situation is found, then one would expect a negative relation
between the fiscal measure and the Federal Reserve's policy
variables.

Two possible policy variables are included in the

regressions run by Cacy.

In the regression of the volume of

■^Cacy, "Budget Deficits," p. 8.
15

See for example, R. L. Tiegen, "The Demand for and Supply
of Money," in R. L. Tiegen, ed., Readings in M oney, National Income,
and Stabilization Policy, 4th ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1978), pp. 69-81.
■^For a discussion of other problems with the "reduced form"
approach, see Blinder and Solow, "Analytical Foundations," pp. 63-78
and the references cited therein.
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member bank reserves on the net liabilities measure, a significant
regression relation is not found.

In the regression of the monetary

base on net liabilities, a significant negative relation is found
\

for the 24-month lag.

However, as Cacy notes, the existence of

autocorrelation makes the interpretation of the regression relation
difficult."^

The evidence thus does not provide support for the

supposition that the negative money supply-deficit relation is due
to Federal Reserve response to the effects of the deficit.
Thus, the evidence provided by Cacy on the relationship
between fiscal policy and the money supply is ambiguous.

Some

regressions provide weak support for a negative relationship, but
a conclusion in favor of a negative relation does not receive support
from the interest rate and monetary base regressions.

V.

Gordon
An analysis of world inflation by Gordon yields some evidence

on the fiscal policy - money supply relationship.

Gordon suggests

that a concern for stabilizing interest rates may lead the monetary
authority to expand the money supply when a demand shock, such as
an expansionary fiscal policy, hits the economy.

Gordon tests the

hypothesis of monetary accommodation of demand shocks by regressing
17

Cacy, "Budget Deficits," p. 8.
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the growth rate of the money supply upon a fiscal policy variable,
the money growth rate lagged one period, a wage rate variable, an
output measure, an internationally traded-goods price index, and
\

an international reserves measure.

The equation is estimated using

quarterly data over the period from the third quarter 1958 to the
first quarter 1973 and over the period from the third quarter 1958
to the fourth quarter 1976.

The fiscal measure employed is the

residual from a regression of the actual federal deficit on the
current and lagged values of real GNP.

This measure is thus an

improvement over the actual deficit since it eliminates, at least
in part, changes in the deficit related to changes in the level of
. .
economic activity.

18

For both estimation periods Gordon finds a negative relation
between the fiscal variable and the growth rate of the money supply.
However, the size of the coefficient varys significantly, changing
from -1.012 from 1958-1973 to -.169 from 1958-1976.

The results

here suggest an offsetting rather than an accommodating relation19
ship, but the relationship seems to be unstable. 7

Gordon s results

should be interpreted cautiously, however, since the equation he
is estimating is in effect a reaction function for the monetary
authority.

This equation is not derived from an explicit structural

18

R. J. Gordon, "World Inflation and Monetary Accommodation
in Eight Countries," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1977),
pp. 409-77.
19

Gordon, •'World Inflation," pp. 450-1.
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model assumed to represent the structure perceived by these
authorities.

The equation estimated may thus be misspecified

^and if it is misspecified the coefficients may be biased and
inconsistent.

VI.

20

Barro
A final study reviewed here that contributes some information

about the relationship between fiscal policy and the money supply
is Barro's study of the relationship between "unanticipated" money
growth and unemployment.

Barro assumes that government expenditures

are financed through taxes and issuance of money.

The financing mix

is arranged so as to minimize the costs of raising the revenue to
cover the expenditures.

Barro asserts that with a given quantity

of tax-raising capital any increase in government expenditures is
financed through both tax increases and an increase in the growth
rate of the money supply.

21

^^For a discussion of specification errors and the effects
of these errors on the estimated coefficients, see J. Kmenta,
Elements of Econometrics (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1971), pp. 392-4.
21 r . J. Barro, "Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment
in the United States," American Economic Review, 67, 2 (March 1977),
pp. 101-15.
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Barro estimates a money growth equation using annual data
for the period 1941-73.
of

The dependent variable is the growth rate

and the explanatory variables include the money growth rate

lagged one and two periods, an unemployment rate variable lagged
one period, and a federal government expenditure variable.

The

government expenditure variable is the difference between the log
of real federal expenditures and the log of "normaln real federal
expenditures.

"Normal" real expenditures are generated from an

adaptive mechanism which specifies that "normal" expenditures are
an exponentially decaying distributed lag of the log of actual real
federal expenditures.

The fiscal variable employed is thus a measure

of the deviation of actual from expected real federal expenditures.
Barro finds a positive relationship between the fiscal measure and
the growth rate of the money supply, thereby implying monetary
accommodation of deviations of actual from normal growth in federal
expenditures.

Barro also enters both the log of current real expen

ditures and the fiscal variable described above as separate arguments
but finds that the coefficient on the log of actual expenditures is
not significantly different from zero.

He thus concludes that only

deviations of actual from "normal" expenditures influence money supply
growth.^

^Barro,

"Unanticipated Money Growth," pp. 103-5.

28

The theoretical basis for the inclusion of the fiscal vari
able in the money supply growth equation, which presumably is the
reduced form of some structural model, apparently rests upon the
argument that an increase in federal expenditures will be financed
in part through an expansion of the money supply.

Barro thus

implicitly assumes either that fiscal and monetary policy are con
ducted by a single authority, "the" government, or else that the
monetary authority is dominated by the fiscal authority.

The latter

assumption may be tenable over part of the sample period (1941-1950),
but does not conform to the institutional reality of macroeconomic
stabilization policies in the post-Accord period.

While it is argued

in Chapter III of this study that fiscal variables should appear in
a monetary policy reaction function, justification of the inclusion
of fiscal variables in such a

function on deficit financing grounds

is inappropriate for the United States in the post-Accord period.
Once this institutional feature of policy-making is recognized,
the interpretation of the positive coefficient on the fiscal vari
able in Barro's money growth equation is difficult without further
knowledge of the structural model which implicitly lies behind
this equation.

VII.

Conclusion
With one exception (Cacy) the studies reviewed in this

chapter have not focused primarily upon the relationship between
fiscal policy and the money supply.

In most cases this question
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is subsidiary to the primary interest of the study and this primary
interest varies from study to study.

It is thus not surprising that

^the evidence on the fiscal policy-money supply relation provided by
these studies is ambiguous and in some cases contradictory.

Several

studies - Wood, Cacy, Gordon, and Friedlaender - find a negative
relationship between fiscal policy and either the money supply or a
monetary policy variable, thereby implying that monetary policy
actions tend to offset expansionary fiscal policy actions.

Other

studies - Froyen and Barro - find a positive relation between fiscal
policy and either the money supply or a monetary policy variable,
thereby implying that monetary policy actions tend to accommodate
expansionary fiscal policy moves.

However, it should be noted that

the appropriateness of the fiscal variable may be questioned since
many of the variables employed do not distinguish between discre
tionary fiscal policy changes and changes in the fiscal variable
induced by a change in economic activity.
In the following chapters we wish to analyze and estimate
empirically the effect of fiscal policy upon monetary policy and
ultimately the money supply.

A basic premise of this study is that

the money supply effects of fiscal policy can be properly analyzed
only within a framework which recognizes the concern of the monetary
authority for both macroeconomic stabilization goals and financial
market stability goals and which specifies a structural model that
allows analysis of the effects of fiscal policy upon the achievement

of these goals.

Our attention is now directed toward this analysis

and estimation in the chapters that follow.

CHAPTER III

MONETARY EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY WHEN
FEDERAL RESERVE BEHAVIOR IS EXOGENOUS

I.

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical

links between fiscal policy and changes in the money supply.

These

links might be separated into two categories - direct and indirect.
The direct links refer to the effects upon the money supply of the
mode of financing the federal government’s budget as distinct from
the effects of the budget and its financing upon economic variables
that lead to changes in economic behavior that in turn affect the
money supply.

These modes of financing include (1) drawing down

Treasury balances built up from past budget surpluses or from past
borrowing in excess of previous deficits,
securities to the Federal Reserve,

(2) selling government

(3) selling government securities

to the non-bank public and/or to commercial banks, and (4) selling
government securities to the non-bank public and/or to commercial
banks accompanied by an equivalent open-market purchase by the .
Federal Reserve.
The indirect links refer to changes in the money supply
induced by adjustments in the spending and portfolio decisions of
the non-bank public, commercial banks, and the Federal Reserve as a
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response to changes in market interest rates, income, wealth, and
other economic variables induced by the current state of the federal
budget and its financing.

Federal Reserve "even-keeling" would thus

be classified as an indirect link within this classificatory scheme.
The indirect links will be analyzed in the context of a linear
variant of an IS-LM model which incorporates endogenous tax receipts,
inflationary expectations, and a government budget constraint.
indirect links with Federal Reserve behavior exogenous

The

are examined

in this chapter; the indirect links when Federal Reserve behavior
is endogenous to the model are examined in the next chapter.
Direct links are examined first, and it is shown that these
effects are of a trivial magnitude and can hereafter be ignored in
this analysis.

After the model is specified, expressions are derived

for the change in the money supply induced by changes in government
expenditures and the exogenous portion of tax receipts.

We show

that a rise in government expenditures unambiguously leads to an
expansion in the money supply and that an exogenous increase in tax
receipts unambiguously lowers the money supply.

II.

Direct Links Between Fiscal Policy and the Money Supply
The direct links between fiscal policy and changes in the

money supply can be treated briefly since, in general, these direct
effects will be of a trivial magnitude.

In analyzing these direct

links, we assume that the federal budget is in deficit and that
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marginal reserve requirements at all commercial banks are the same.
This latter assumption allows us to ignore changes in the money
supply due to changes in the distribution of deposits and reserves
within the banking system that result from the mode of financing
the deficit.

Our primary analytic concern is whether the mode of

financing as distinct from its effects upon economic variables such
as interest rates significantly changes the volume of deposits and
reserves within the banking system and hence changes the money
supply.

A.

Financing Through Drawdown of Treasury Balances at the Federal
Reserve
If the Treasury draws down its balances at the Federal

Reserve, then, ceteris paribus, the money supply will expand as
deposits are transferred from the Treasury, whose deposits are not
included in the money supply, to the public, whose deposits are,
of course, included in the money supply.

Furthermore, the monetary

base will expand as Treasury balances at the Federal Reserve fall.
If, however, Treasury balances are rebuilt through the sale of
securities to the public or through tax collections, the money
supply and monetary base will contract as deposits are shifted
from the public to the Treasury in payment for the securities or
in payment of taxes.

The initial change in the money supply and

monetary base may also be offset (partially or fully) through
Federal Reserve open-market sales.

Typically, changes in Treasury
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balances at the Federal Reserve are taken as a technical factor
which the Federal Reserve acts to offset.
If Treasury balances are quickly rebuilt and if the Federal
Reserve "defends" against changes in the money supply and the mone
tary base due to this mode of finance, the effects upon the money
supply and reserves in the system will be short-lived and will be
of a trivial magnitude.

Empirical evidence on Federal Reserve

response to the drawdown of Treasury balances has been provided
by Lombra and Torto.^

They found that changes in the monetary

base induced by a reduction in Treasury balances are at least
partially offset by open-market sales.

Thus we might conclude

that typically the effects upon the money supply and monetary base
are partially offset by Federal Reserve actions.

Empirical evi

dence on the rebuilding of Treasury balances and the statistical
relationship between changes in Treasury balances and changes in
M-^ has been provided by Hamblin.

2

Hamblin found that Treasury

balances fluctuate widely from week to week, with declines being
3

followed by rebuilding of these balances.

Furthermore, in

% . E. Lombra and R. G. Torto, "Federal Reserve 'Defensive
Behavior' and the Reverse Causation Argument," Southern Economic
Journal, 40, 1 (July 1973), p. 51.
^M. Hamblin, "Treasury Deposits and the Money Supply,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review, February 1977,
pp. 14-20.
^Hamblin, "Treasury Deposits," Chart 1, p. 16.
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regressions of the change in

on changes in Treasury deposits

at the Federal Reserve, Hamblin found weak statistical relation
ships for weekly data (R^ = .17), monthly data (R^ = .13), and
for quarterly data (R^ = .10).^

This short-lived money supply

effect of changes in Treasury balances has also been noted by Hansen.**
The evidence cited above is consistent with the conclusion
that any effects of financing a deficit through the drawdown of
Treasury balances upon the money supply are short-lived and are
therefore of negligible interest for this study since we focus
upon quarterly periods as the basic period of analysis.

B.

Financing Through the Sale of Government Securities to the
Federal Reserve
The sale of securities directly to the Federal Reserve by

the Treasury, which would increase the money supply and reserves
in the banking system as Treasury balances created in the sale are
spent, also has negligible effects upon the money supply.

At any

given time, the Treasury is allowed by U.S. statute to borrow a
maximum of $5 billion directly from the Federal Reserve.
in the

However,

few occasions in which this has occurred in the past, direct

borrowing has typically

been limited to special

Treasury certificates

^Hamblin, "Treasury Deposits," Table 1, p. 17.
-*B. Hansen, "On the Effects of
Fiscal and Monetary Policy:A
Taxonomic Discussion," American Economic Review, 63, 4 (September
1973), p. 551.
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g
which were to be repaid within a few days of issue.

Thus this

mode of finance can be ruled out as having any significant direct
effects upon the money supply.

C.

Financing Through the Sale of Government Securities to the
Non-Bank Public and/or to Commercial Banks
The sale of securities to the non-bank public and/or to

commercial banks generally has negligible effects upon the money
supply and the monetary base. Sale of securities to the non-bank
public reduces the balances of the non-bank public but results in
an increase in Treasury balances at commercial banks; the money
supply is thus reduced at this point.

When the Treasury balances

are transferred to the Federal Reserve, reserves in the system
fall, but these reserves are restored and the original decline
in the non-bank public’s balances is reversed when these balances
are spent by the Treasury.

7

The sale of securities to commercial banks would likewise
have no money supply effects if the purchase by the banks were
financed through a sale of an equivalent amount of other assets
held by the banks.

In this case, the reduction in the deposits of

6The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions, 6th
ed. (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
September 1974), p. 66.
^It should be noted that the primary purpose of the
Treasury's holding deposits at the Federal Reserve and at com
mercial banks (tax and loan accounts) is to reduce the effect
of government financing actions upon bank reserves and interest
rates.
See P. Brockschmidt, "Treasury Cash Balances," Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review, July-August 1975,
pp. 12-13.
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the non-bank public stemming from the banks' sale of assets would
offset the money supply effects of the Treasury expenditures and
the money supply would not change.
If the bank's purchase of the securities were financed
through a drawdown of excess reserves or through increased^borrowing
at the Federal Reserve, Treasury expenditure of the proceeds of the
security sale would change the money supply.

If commercial banks

rebuilt excess reserves or repaid the borrowing at the Federal
Reserve through a sale of other assets, then the initial money
supply effects would be reversed and the money supply would have
risen only temporarily.

However, if the security sales alter

economic variables such as market interest rates that affect banks
willingness to hold excess reserves or to borrow from the Federal
Reserve, then commercial banks may not fully rebuild excess reserves
and may extend their borrowing from the Federal Reserve.

In this

instance, the money supply will not return to its initial level.
The money supply effect in this case results from a change in banks'
portfolio behavior as a result of the change in market interest
rates and, under the classificatory scheme outlined in the intro
duction, is properly classified as an indirect link between fiscal
policy and the money supply.
Thus we can conclude that the third mode of financing the
deficit will not have any direct effects upon the money supply but
may, through effects upon market variables that affect private
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behavior, have an indirect effect upon the money supply.

This

indirect effect is examined later in this chapter.
•v

D.

Financing Through the Sale of Government Securities to the
Non-Bank Public and/or Commercial Banks Accompanied by Federal
Reserve Open-Market Purchases
The sale of securities by the Treasury accompanied by an

equivalent open-market purchase by the Federal Reserve was effec
tively eliminated as a viable mode of finance by the Treasury Federal Reserve Accord of 1951.

In the period 1942-1951, Federal

Reserve pegging of interest rates led to Federal Reserve purchase
of all securities offered to it by private holders; in effect the
Federal Reserve monetized any Treasury sales of securities in
0
order to prevent interest rates from rising.

The automatic

response of the Federal Reserve to movements in interest rates
was eliminated by the Accord of 1951.

This Accord has been widely

interpreted to mean that the Federal Reserve was freed to conduct
monetary policy so as to achieve the goals specified in the Employ
ment Act of 1946.
the Accord's " . . .

For example, Chandler and Goldfeld suggest that
longer-run purpose was to work toward a situation

in which its open-market policies.would be shaped almost exclu
sively by economic stabilization objectives, and its purchases and
sales would again be directed exclusively toward regulating the

®L. V. Chandler and S. M. Goldfeld, The Economics of Money
and Banking, 7th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 555564.

Q

reserve position of the banking system . . . ."

As a result of

this change in the orientation of monetary policy, the monetiza
tion of Treasury securities sales was eliminated as an acceptable
method of financing a deficit.
We may, however, observe a federal government budget deficit
and a simultaneous open market purchase by the Federal R e s e r v e . ^
In the post-Accord period, this simultaneity is presumably the
outcome of a Federal Reserve decision that fiscal policy has not
been expansive enough or that a rise in market intrest rates gene
rated by the sale of securities by the Treasury is unacceptable.
This change in security holdings by the Federal Reserve is properly
classified as an indirect link between fiscal policy and changes in
the money supply.

Federal Reserve response to the deficit will be

analyzed in Chapter IV when the Federal Reserve is treated as
endogenous.
The central argument of the discussion presented above is
that the financing of the deficit - whether through temporary draw
down of Treasury balances or through sale of securities - has no
significant money supply effects other than the effects resulting
from changes in market variables that lead to changes in private
sector or Federal Reserve behavior that in turn affect the money

9Chandler and Goldfeld,

The Economics of Money and Banking,

p. 567.
^®T. D. Simpson, Money, Banking, and Economic Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 248.
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supply.

Thus the remaining analysis will concentrate upon the

indirect effects of the deficit upon the money supply and the
direct links will hereafter be ignored.

III.

Specification of the IS-LM Model
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the indirect

effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply are examined within
the context of a model of the macroeconomy.

This model is also

employed in the next chapter as representative of the Federal
Reserve's perception of the structure of the economy.
The equations of the model are:
Product Market
(3.1)

Cfc = a^ +

- T fc) + a2 WEt>

(consumption function)

g
(3.2)

WE

t

(3.3)

(wealth definition)

= (fE.) + (_£.) + B t ,

!t - b Q +

t

+
(investment function)

= Et ,

(export function)

(3.4)

E

(3.5)

IMt = cQ + c ^ ,

(import function)

(3.6)

Gfc = Gt ,

(government expenditure
function)

(3.7)

It - r 0 + r1Y t

(net tax function)

(3.8)

Y fc » Ct + It + Gt + Et - IMt ,

(equilibrium condition)

Money Market

(3.9)

M° = £0 +

+ £2Y t + f3^ ,

(money demand function)

(3.10) tij! = g0 + gjl” + g2l”S + g3UBRt>

(money supply function)

(3.11) i f . I f ,

(discount rate function)

(3.12) UBRt « UBRt ,

(unborrowed reserves
function)

(3.13) 1* = hQ +

+ h2Y t ,

(3.14) M® = M f

(term structure of
interest rates
function)
(equilibrium condition)

Phillips Curve Relation
(3.15) P t = j() + J ^ )

+ J2 (-|i_) + JsP«.

*
00
1
(3.16) P? = (l-£) Z, An" P
,
t
n=l
t-n

(Phillips Curve
function)

(price expectations
function)

Aggregate Price Level
(3.17) P t = P ^ d

+ Pt),

where:
= nominal income,
dYt_^ = change in Y from period t-2 to t-1,
POT
Y fc

= nominal potential income,

(price level definition)

= nominal consumption expenditures,
= nominal investment expenditures,
= nominal government expenditures on goods and services,
= nominal net tax receipts (total tax receipts - transfer
payments),
= nominal exports,
= nominal imports,
= a representative nominal short-term market interest

= a representative

rate,

nominal long-term market interest rate,

= nominal net wealth,
= nominal value of net dividend payments to the public by
domestic corporations,
= nominal value of the economy’s capital stock,

= nominal monetary base,
= volume of perpetual government securities with an interest
payment of $l/year held by the public,
= nominal value of government securities held by the public,

nominal demand for money (M^),
nominal supply of money (M^),

Federal Reserve discount rate,
nominal volume of unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve
requirement changes,
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P

= aggregate price level,

•

Pt

= inflation rate,
= expected inflation rate, and

Ut

= total unemployment rate.

The subscript t refers to the time period under consideration.
A bar over a variable (for example, UBRt) indicates that the vari
able is exogenous.

In the present formulation of the model the

endogenous variables are Y t , Ct , It , IMt> T t , W E fc, M^, M E , i£, P t ,
•E
P fc, and P t .

The exogenous and lagged endogenous variables in this

S
Z
formulation of the model are K t , Gt> Bt> it_ 2 > ^Y t-1’ It-1’

®t*

iE S , UBRt , U fc, Y*0 T , and P t_n (n = 1, . . .,«>).
Before examining the consumption equation, it is necessary
to consider the definition of net wealth employed in the model.
Nominal net wealth is defined as the sum of the value of the capi
tal stock, the nominal value of the monetary base, and the nominal
value of government securities held
value of the capital stock might

by thepublic.

The nominal

be measured by the nominal value

of the ownership claims to this stock of capital.

The value of

these equities then depends upon expected earnings and the discount
rate applied to the earnings.

Assuming for simplicity that capital

is a perpetuity and that the expected returns in the current and
all future periods are equal, we can write the value of the capital
stock in the current period as (Kt/it) where

is a measure of
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the expected earnings from the stock of capital.

The value of the

capital stock can thus change because of a change in expected returns
(assumed to be exogenous) or because of a change in the long-term
interest r a t e . ^

The nominal value of the monetary base and the

stock of government securities held by the public represents the
liabilities of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to the public
and are hence counted as private sector wealth.
The inclusion of the monetary base is uncontroversial;

12

however, it has been argued that the value of demand deposits should
be added to the monetary base and included in net wealth.

13

The case

for inclusion of demand deposits in net wealth rests upon the argu
ment that since banks are prevented from paying explicit interest
on demand deposits, and since banks in competitive markets would
pay interest on demand deposits, banks earn monopoly profits.

How

ever, these monopoly profits should be reflected in the value of
the bank's stock.

Furthermore, banks pay implicit interest on

demand deposits; thus even if banks were not required to hold
reserves against demand deposits, the value of the bank to its
owners would not increase on a one-for-one basis with increases

■^L. A. Meyer, "Wealth Effects and the Effectiveness of
Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
6, 4 (November 1974), p. 488.
12
AASee for example, D. Patinkin, Money, Interest, and Prices,
2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 289.
11
AJSee for example, B. Pesek and T. Saving, Money, Wealth,
and Economic Theory (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 79-102.
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in demand deposits because of the implicit interest payments made
by the bank."^

Therefore, demand

as net wealth for the

deposits will

purposes of this analysis

notbe included
andwill be con

sidered as representing an asset of the non-bank public which is
fully offset by an equivalent liability of banks.
Furthermore, it is often argued that the value of government
securities should not

be included as net wealth

because individuals

anticipate higher tax

payments in the future to

pay interest on the

bonds, and the discounted value of these tax payments is thought to
exactly offset the current value of the government securities.

It

has also been suggested that while some discounting takes place
the public does not fully discount the anticipated future taxes
and hence some fraction of the value of government securities outstanding should be included as net wealth.

15

However, the usual

assumption that the public does not anticipate higher tax rates
to pay bond interest will be followed in this paper and the entire
value of government securities in the hands of the public will be
included as net wealth.

Thus net wealth can be written as:
K

GS

“ t '
t

+ ("T> + B f
t

The consumption function relates the level of nominal con
sumption expenditures to the key determinants of these expenditures,

•^D. Patinkin, "Money and Wealth," in D. Patinkin, Studies
in Monetary Economics, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 168-94.
■^Patinkin, Money, Interest, and Prices, p. 289.
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and the function employed in this model is in the spirit of the
Ando-Modigliani life-cycle consumption function.

Ando-Modigliani

begin from the assumption that individuals maximize their lifetime
consumption stream subject to the constraint that the present value
of consumption equals the present value of the individual's human
and non-human earnings.

From this starting point and based upon a

number of other assumptions, Ando-Modigliani develop an aggregate
consumption function that contains current labor income and net
wealth lagged one period as arguments in the function.

16

For sim

plicity, current income will be substituted for current labor income
and current net wealth will be substituted for net wealth lagged
one period in the consumption function employed in this model.

The

coefficient of current labor income, a^, is greater than zero but
less than one, as is the coefficient for net wealth, a 2 «

The Ando-

Modigliani model implies that the coefficient for net wealth will
be small since an increase in net wealth is an addition to a stock
and consumption from this change in net wealth will be spread over
the lifetime of an individual.

Thus the model suggests that a 2

is

less than ai; empirical research bears out this theoretical expec
tatio n . ^
The investment function relates the level of investment
expenditures to the hypothesized key determinants of these

■^A. Ando and F. Modigliani, "The 'Life-Cycle' Hypothesis
of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests," American Economic
Review, 53, 1 (March 1963), pp. 56-9.
■^Ando and Modigliani, "The 'Life-Cycle' Hypothesis,"
pp. 60 and 64.

47

expenditures, and the investment function employed in this model draws
from several different theories of investment behavior.

The Jorgenson

model of aggregate investment behavior suggests that the rental rate
per unit of capital adjusted for the price level is an important deter
minant of the firm’s desired capital stock; through its effect upon
the level of the desired capital stock, the rental rate exerts an in
fluence upon net investment by the firm.

The rental rate is affected

by the long-term rate of interest, the depreciation rate, the tax rate
appropriate to the firm, the proportion of depreciation expense deduc
tible from the firm's tax bill, and the proportion of interest cost
deductible from the tax bill.

18

If all elements of the rental rate

other than the long-term rate of interest change slowly or are con
stant, then most of the changes in the real rental rate can be attri
buted to changes in the long-term interest rate, and the long-term
interest rate, which is readily observable, can be used as a proxy
for changes in the rental rate.

It is assumed in this study that the

long-term interest rate is a proxy for the rental rate.

The Jorgenson

investment model as modified here implies that the interest rate affects
investment expenditures with a lag; the form and length of this lag
is, however, an empirical question.

19

The expected sign of the coef

ficient on the long-term interest rate, b^, is negative.
18

D. W. Jorgenson, "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior,"
American Economic Review, 53, 2(May 1963), pp. 248-9.
19

The long-term interest rate lagged two periods gave the
best fit for the investment equation (see Chapter V of this study).
For this reason the long-term rate lagged two periods is employed
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One can also argue that the level of investment is deter
mined in part by the firm's expectations about future levels of
sales and that these expectations are in part related to past changes
in sales.

The change in sales from period t-2 to t-1 affects the

firm's expectations of the change in sales from t-1 to t; this latter
expected change affects the firm's desired level of the capital stock,
and hence investment, in period t.

If the firm forms its expec

tations in this manner, then an accelerator variable should be
included in the investment equation.

20

The change in output from

t-2 to t-1 is employed as the accelerator variable in this model.
Furthermore, the level of investment is in part influenced by the
level of current output ,

^ and this explanatory variable is also

included in the investment equation in this model.

The expected

in the IS-LM model.
This finding is in accord with previous studies.
See for example, J. R. Moroney and J. M. Mason, "The Dynamic
Impacts of Autonomous Expenditures and the Monetary Base on Aggre
gate Income," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 3, 4 (November
1971), p. 798 and the studies referenced therein.
^ S e e for example, D. J. Ott, A. F. Ott, and J. H. Yoo,
Macroeconomic Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 93-110.
The inclusion of an accelerator variable is consistent with the
Jorgenson investment model.
See Jorgenson, "Capital Theory,"
pp. 248-51.
0*1
AAIn the Jorgenson approach to investment behavior, the level
of output affects the level of the desired capital stock and hence
investment.
See Jorgenson, "Capital Theory," p. 249. Furthermore,
as noted by Ackley, the accelerator model can be formulated in terms
of the level of output.
See G. Ackley, Macroeconomics: Theory and
Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 644-7.
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sign on the accelerator coefficient, b 2 » is positive as is the
expected sign of the output coefficient,
Finally, many studies have shown that the adjustment of
actual investment to the desired rate of investment takes more than
one quarter .

^

The gradual adjustment of actual to desired invest

ment may be due to technological constraints in implementing the
investment plans.

The effect of gradual adjustment upon the invest

ment equation is now demonstrated.

The discussion of investment

expenditures up to this point can be summarized in an equation of
the following sort

I? = b* + b* iZ „ + b*dY
+ b*Y where
t
0
1 t-2
2 t-1
3 t

D
Z
I^ = desired investment in period t, i,_
dY „, and Y are as
t
r
t-2*
t-1
t
defined previously, and the b*, i = 1, 2, 3, are the coefficients
on the explanatory variables.

The relationship between actual

investment, I., and desired investment, I?, can be written as
t
t
I. - I . = v(ID - I„ ,).
t
t—1
t
t— -1-

That is, the difference between actual

investment in the current and previous periods is proportional to
the gap between desired investment in the current period and actual
investment in the previous period,

v is the adjustment coefficient

and indicates the rate of adjustment of actual to desired investment.
22

C. W. Bischoff, "Business Investment in the 1970’s: A
Comparison of- Models," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1
(1971), pp. 13-58.
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Rearranging this equation we obtain I? a
C

I
I.
y
L

- (i^L) I. ,.
y

Sub-

L-X

stituting from the equation for desired investment we obtain Ifc =
vbg + vbji^_2 + vb^dYt_1 + vb§Yt + ( l - v ) ^ ^ .

Letting vbg = bQ ,

vb* = b . , vb* = b , vb* = b , and (1-v) = b,, we obtain the invest^
A
J
J
ment equation described earlier in this chapter

rt - b0 + biit-2 + b2dYt-l + b 3Yt + V t - r
The expected sign of the coefficient on the level of investment in
the previous quarter is positive.
Exports are taken as exogenous in the model employed in this
study since exports are only a small part of total output of the U.S.
economy and are influenced in the short-run by the rate of economic
activity in foreign countries and by negotiated trade agreements.

23

Imports are taken as endogenous to the model with current income as
the chief determinant of the level of imports.

The expected sign

of the coefficient on current income, c^, is positive.
Government expenditures are assumed to be exogenous.

Since

the inside lag in the implementation of changes in government expenditures has been estimated as greater than three months,

24

the

^ M o r o n e y and Mason, "The Dynamic Impacts," p. 799.
Fels, "The Recognition Lag and Semi-Automatic Stabili
zers ," Review of Economics^and Statistics, 45, 3 (August 1963)
pp. 280-5.
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assumption of exogenous government expenditure is thought to be
reasonable in the context of a quarterly model.

The same assumption

cannot be made for net tax receipts since, with a given tax rate
structure and given structure of transfer payments, changes in
income will produce variations in net tax receipts.

Net taxes

are assumed to be related to the level of income, and the coefficient
on income, r-^, is assumed to be positive.

It should be noted that

changes in either the tax rate structure or in the structure of
transfer payments will change the value of this coefficient.
The equilibrium condition for the product market merely
states that the current level of nominal income depends upon the
current levels of nominal consumption expenditures, nominal invest
ment expenditures, nominal government expenditures, and nominal net
exports (E,. - IM ).
c
t

It should be noted, however, that because of

the specific formulation of the investment function, lagged values
of investment expenditure and nominal income affect the current level
of nominal income.
The money demand function employed here can be written in
general form as:

M^ = £(i™» Y t , P ® ) .

This general form is broadly

consistent with a number of different theoretical and empirical
approaches to the demand for money,

25

although in many instances

25see for example, S. M. Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money
Revisited," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3 (1973), pp. 576638; A. Meltzer, "The Demand for Money: The Evidence from the Time
Series," Journal of Political Economy, 71, 3 (June 1963), pp. 219-46;
M. Friedman, "The Quantity Theory of Money - A Restatement," in
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the scale variable employed is either permanent income or net
wealth.

The scale variable employed here will be current nominal

income.

The specific form of the money demand function utilized
in

*f

in this study is linear in i , Y , and P*;.
w
u
u
can thus be written as

= f^ +

The money demand function

+ ^2^t

exPecte<*

sign of the coefficient on i™ is negative (economic units economize
on money balances as the opportunity cost of holding these balances
rises), the expected sign of the coefficient on Y t is positive (as
the scale variable expands economic units expand their holdings of
all normal goods, to include money balances), and the expected sign
•E
of the coefficient on P is negative ( the expected rate of infla
tion can be viewed as the rate of return on physical goods so that
as the expected rate of inflation rises economic units retrench their
holdings of money balances).
One might object to the inclusion of both the nominal short
term rate and the expected rate of inflation as explanatory variables
in the money demand function' as redundant.

Economic theory suggests

that nominal market interest rates reflect (at least partially)
anticipated inflation.
tionship between

However, many empirical studies of the rela

anticipated inflation and nominal interest rates

have found that anticipated inflation affects these interest rates

M. Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 3-21; and D. E. W.
Laidler, The Demand for Money. 2nd ed. (New York: Dun-Donnelley
Publishing Corp., 1977), pp. 49-98.

with a coefficient of less than unity.

26

Thus nominal market rates

may not fully reflect anticipated inflation rates.

If this is the

case, a direct effect of anticipated inflation on the demand for
money is possible even though anticipated inflation indirectly affects
this demand through its effects upon nominal market interest rates.
Recent empirical tests of a money demand function that includes both
nominal interest rates and expected inflation as explanatory variables have found both variables to be significant.

27

'

Based upon

these empirical results, both nominal interest rates and expected
inflation will be included as explanatory variables in the money
demand function.
For convenience, the money demand function will be written
in inverse form and rearranged so that i^ is the dependent variable.
Performing the necessary manipulations, we obtain the following
equation which will be utilized in the remainder of this paper

(3.18)

i” = fJ + fjM^ + fjYfc + f^P®

where
f0 = ^

W

’ fl =

f2 = - < V V ’ and f3 = " (f3/fl)#

26see for example, D. Laidler and M. Parkin, "Inflation: A
Survey," The Economic Journal, 85, 34 (December 1975), pp. 771-2 and
the articles cited therein.
27See for example, Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited,"
pp. 577-638; A. A. Shapiro, "Inflation, Lags, and the Demand for
Money," International Economic Review, 14, 1 (February 1973), pp. 8196; and J. Melitz, "Inflationary Expectations and the French Demand
for Money, 1959-70," Manchester School, 44, 1 (March 1976), pp. 17-41.
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The linear money supply function utilized in this model can
be derived from the following model which relates the level of
(currency plus demand deposits) to the level of unborrowed reserves
and the multiplier for unborrowed reserves.

Since the ultimate

concern of this paper is focused upon the effects of fiscal policy
upon the money supply, the money supply function is developed in
greater detail than any of the other functions in this model.

A

model which has as a special case a linear money supply function is
now developed.
The behavioral relationships of the model are

(3.19)

Ct/DDt = k(i™, i ™ , Y fc) ,

(3.20)

TDt/DDt = td(i®, i ™ , Y t),

(3.21)

GDt/DDt = g,

(3.22)

XRt/DDt = e(i™), and

(3.23)

BRt/DDt = b(i“ , i°S).

The identities of the model are

(3.24)

B. = UBR. + BR,. + C„,
t
t
c
t’

(3.25)

Bt = UBBt + BRt , and

(3.26)
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where
Ct

= currency holdings of the non-bank in period t,

DDfc = volume of demand deposits in period t,
TDt = volume of time deposits in period t,
GDt = volume of Federal government deposits in period t,
XRt = volume of excess reserves in period t,
BRt = volume of borrowed reserves in period t,
Bt

= monetary base in period t,

UBRt = volume of unborrowed reserves in period t,
UBB^ = volume of the unborrowed monetary base in period t,
RR^jj ^ = volume of required reserves on demand deposits in period t
= rDDtDDt»
RR^,p t = volume of required reserves on time deposits in period t
rTDtTDt»
RR,

. = volume of required reserves on government deposits in period

CjU yC

C = rGD,tGDf
rDD

t= weighted fractional-reserve requirement on DDt ,

rTD

t= weiShted ^racti°nal“reserve requirement on TDt,

rGD

t= weighted fractional-reserve requirement on GDt =»r ^

i™
TD
i.
t
DS
ifc
Yt

= a representative short-term market interest rate
= interest rate on TD,.,
t’
= Federal Reserve discount rate in period
= nominal income in period t.

t, and

in period t,
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The behavioral relationships explain the movement of the
Ct/DDt, TDt/DDt , GD /DDfc, XRt/DDt, and BRt/DDt ratios.

As will

be seen later, changes in these ratios affect the unborrowed reserve
multiplier and hence affect the level of M^.

The following assump

tions are made with respect to the signs of the partial derivatives
of the ratios listed in (3.19) - (3.23)

^

3k/3im < 0, 3k/3iTD < 0, 3k/3Y > 0,
3td/3im < 0, 3td/3iTD > 0, 3td/3Y > 0,
3e/3im < 0, 3b/3im > 0 ,

and 3b/3iDS < 0.

The GDt/DDt ratio is assumed to be exogenous since movements in this
ratio depend mainly upon the timing of receipts and expenditures by
the Treasury and less upon movements in market variables.
OQ
^°The assumptions made are consistent with theory and
generally consistent with the available empirical evidence.
See
for example, W. R. Hosek and F. Zahn, Monetary Theory, Policy, and
Financial Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), pp. 82-104. The
empirical evidence for the sign of 3k/3im is mixed.
For empirical
studies that support the contention that 3k/3im < 0, see for example
W. R. Hosek, "Determinants of the Money Multiplier," Quarterly Review
of Economics and Business, 10, 2 (Summer 1970), pp. 37-46, and A.
Hess, "An Explanation of Short-Run Fluctuations in the Ratio of
Currency to Demand Deposits," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
3, 3 (August 1971), pp. 666-79. For an empirical study that finds
3k/3im > 0 see W. E. Becker, Jr., "Determinants of the United States
Currency-Demand Deposit Ratio," Journal of Finance, 30, 1 (March 1975),
pp. 57-74. However, since most studies find 3k/3im < 0, this assump
tion will be maintained.
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Utilizing identities (3.25) and (3.26) and suppressing for
convenience the time subscript we can write

UBB » RRpjj + RR jjj + RRG d + XR + C - BR.

Dividing by DD and substituting from (3.19) - (3.23) into this
equation we obtain

Rearranging, we obtain

UBB = [rDD + rTDtd(im , iT D , Y) + r ^ g + e(ira) + k(im , iT D , Y)
- b(im , iDS)]DD.

Solving for DD, we obtain:
1
](UBB)
DD = ['
rDD+rDDg+rTDtd(im*iT° ,Y)+e(im )+k(im ,iT D ,Y)-b(im ,iDS)

An expression for
definition

= DD + C.

M

can now be derived by utilizing the
Thus we have

= [1 + kCim ,iT D ,Y)]DD.

Substituting the expression for DD derived earlier we obtain

•](UBB).
^rDD+rDD®+rTDt^ ^ m ''1'

>J-

,Y)-b(im , i ^ )
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The responsiveness of M-^ to a changes in im , iD S , UBR and UBR
can now be derived.
variables.

The remaining analysis will focus upon these

For notational convenience let [rDD + rDDg + rTDtd(im ,

iT D , Y) + e(im ) + k(im , iT D , Y) - b(im , iDS)] = A and [1 + k(im ,
TD
i , Y ) ] = E.

The expression for

can now be written as

= msUBB where ms = EA~^.

The partial

derivative of M^ with respect to im is given by

3M1
-

=

- (rTD

Based upon a priori
models

™

expectations and

of the money supply, the sign

mined in the following manner.

A-1UBB.

the results of most empirical
of the derivative canbe deter

In evaluating the expression

brackets [ ] we find that 3k/3im (l-ms) is > 0

in

since 3k/3im < 0 and

[1-ms] < 0 since E > 1 and A ^> 1, and that (rTTJL!l! + -§i=—
- iOl_) < 0
3im
3im
3im
since

< 0,
3im
29

< 0, and
3im

>0.^

ms is > 0 so that the

3im

-1
In evaluating the expression EA , we find the proposition
E > 1 to be uncontroversial since the C/DD ratio is positive and
E = 1 + C/DD. The assertion that A“ 1 > 1 is subject to empirical
refutation since one might conceive of a situation where the expec
tation is that A~1 < 1. However, the available empirical evidence
supports the original assertion that A--*- > 1. See for example, D.
Fand, "Some Implications of Money Supply Analysis," American Economic
Review, 57, 2 (May 1967), pp. 380-400; K. Brunner and A. Meltzer,
"Some Further Investigations of Demand and Supply Functions for
Money," Journal of Finance, 19, 2 (May 1964), pp. 240-83; R. L.
Tiegen, "Demand and Supply Functions for Money in the United States:
Some Structural Estimates," Econometrica, 32, 4 (October 1964),
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expression in brackets [ ] is > 0.

3M,
Thus --- > 0 so that forces
3im

which cause short-term interest rates to rise - such as expansionary
fiscal policy - lead to an induced expansion in the money supply.
The responsiveness of

to changes in the Federal Reserve's

policy instruments can also be determined within this model.

The

volume of unborrowed reserves (UBR), a component of UBB, was selected
as the chief instrument of monetary control.

It was felt that

changes in unborrowed reserves were dominated more by Federal Reserve
actions than were other possible measures (the unborrowed monetary
base or the monetary base), and, in fact, this is the variable used
in most large-scale econometric models of the

economy.

^

Another

pp. 476-509; W. E. Gibson, "Demand and Supply Functions for Money in
the United States: Theory and Measurement," Econometrica, 40, 2
(March 1972), pp. 361-70; R. L. Tiegen, "Demand and Supply Functions
for Money: Another Look at Theory and Measurement," Econometrica,
44, 2 (March 1976), pp. 377-85; and R. Rasche, "A Review of Empirical
Studies of the Money Supply Mechanism," Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Review, 54, 7 (July 1972), pp. 11-19.
•^The theoretical arguments for this assertion have not,
however, been accepted uncritically.
See for example, F. deLeeuw
and J. Kalchbrenner, "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their
Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization - Comment," Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 51, 4 (April 1969), pp. 6-11, and
L. C. Andersen and J. C. Jordan, "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A
Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization - Reply,"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 51, 4 (April 1969), pp.
12-16.
For a detailed analysis of various monetary and reserve vari
ables that the Federal Reserve could use in giving instructions to
the Open Market Committee see R. G. Davis, "Short-Run Targets for
Open Market Operations," in Open Market Policies and Operating Pro
cedures - Staff Studies (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, July 1971), pp. 37-69.
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policy instrument, the discount rate, is assumed to be exogenous.
It is felt that this assumption is justified by the fact that
borrowed reserves are a small portion of total reserves, by the
fact that the Federal Reserve does not generally use the discount
rate as an active tool for achieving its major objectives, and by
the fact that changes in the discount rate tend to follow changes
in short-term market interest rates.

31

Finally, reserve require

ments are assumed to be exogenous since this is an infrequently
applied policy tool.
The partial derivative of

with respect to UBR is given by

the following expression

3M 1
3UBR

0
0 .m
ms + iSE.
—
3im 3UBR

■ UBR.

Since a change in UBR will, in general, affect market rates of
interest and since a change in market interest rates will affect ms,
.
. »ni
must include the term (£515.) (£±— ) in the expression for — ±— .
..m 9UBR
3UBR
increase in UBR will reduce ira.
hence, ^ms < 0.
3UBR

31

Thus if

An

A reduction in im will reduce ms;

iLi— UBR > ms, ^1 . may be < 0.
aim 3UBR
9UBR

For an empirical study of discount rate changes, see R. T.
Froyen, "The Determinants of Federal Reserve Discount Rate Policy,''
Southern Economic Journal, 42, 2 (October 1975), pp. 193-200.
Froyen
found a positive relationship between the discount rate and other
short-term market interest rates. He interpreted this relationship
as resulting from Federal Reserve attempts to keep the discount rate
in line with the costs of other ways of adjusting the short-term
reserve positions of banks. He also found that the balance of pay
ments deficit had a significant effect upon discount rate policy.
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9m.
However, the available empirical evidence supports — 1— > 0 .
3UBR

3 0

Decisions by the Federal Reserve to increase UBR, whether exogenous
as in this chapter or endogenous as in the next chapter (perhaps
induced by an expansionary fiscal policy) would thus result in an
expansion in M^.
The partial derivative of

DS

with respect to i

is given by

3M
— — = -[-(.§£— )A“ ^*E*UBR].
.DS
DS
3i
3i
Since ^ — < 0 and the expression in brackets [ ] is > 0.
3iDS

3M i

— —
3i

Thus
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< 0.

Federal Reserve increases in the discount rate result

in reductions in M^.
Thus far we have discussed the effects of changes in im and
Federal Reserve policy tools upon
money supply model.

within the context of a specific

The money supply model just developed and

analyzed is nonlinear.

Since the IS-LM model used in this study is

linear, the money supply model is linearized for compatibility with
the other equations in the model.

In general terms, we can write

the money supply model developed above as

DS
= ms(i , i ) UBR where

OO
See the references cited in footnote 29 for this empirical
evidence.
■^See the references cited in footnote 29 for empirical
studies that support 3M^/3iD^ < 0.
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ms( ) is the monetary policy variable multiplier.

In principle,

all of the variables listed in equation (3.19) through (3.23)
should be included in the money supply equation.

However, pre

cedents in the money supply literature (see footnote 29) will be
followed, and the independent variables employed in the money
supply function will be limited to im , i*3^, and UBR.

In linear

form the money supply function can be written as M| = gQ + g^i™ +
®2*t^ + B3UB\

with g.p gj > 0 and g 2

< 0.

The coefficient signs

are based upon the discussion above.
The model employed in this analysis has two different interest
rates in the structural equations of the model.

The short-term

interest rate is determined in the money market, but the long-term
interest rate is hypothesized to affect nominal spending.

A

simplistic term structure equation (3.13) is added to the model in
order to tie these rates together.

The long-term rate is seen as

being influenced by the current short-term rate (a crude represen
tation of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure) and
also by the current level of nominal income (nominal income is taken
as a crude proxy for the demand for loanable funds and is seen as
influencing the long-term rate directly as well as through its
. 3
influence on the short-term rate).

4

•^For an explanation of the expectations and market segmen
tation of the term structure, see for example, F. Modigliani and
R. Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," American Economic
Review, 56, 2 (May 1966), pp. 178-197, and B. G. Malkiel, The Term
Structure of Interest Rates: Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Appli
cations (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1970).
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Equation (3.14) closes the money market equations by stipu
lating that in every time period, the nominal demand for money
equals the nominal supply of money.
The relationship between the rate of inflation and the rate
of unemployment - the Phillips Curve relation - is developed in
equation (3.15).

The rate of inflation is hypothesized to be a

function of the inverse of the rate of unemployment, the ratio of
nominal income to potential income, and the expected rate of infla
tion.

The expected sign of the coefficient on the inverse of the

unemployment rate, j^, is positive.

The unemployment rate can be

viewed as a proxy for demand pressure in labor markets so that as
the unemployment rate falls, demand pressure in labor markets builds
up, thereby tending to increase the rate of change in wages.
Assuming a constant mark-up type of pricing in product markets,
a rise in the rate of change in wages is translated into an increase
in the rate of inflation.

35

The expected sign of the coefficient on the ratio of nominal
income to nominal potential income, j 2 » is positive.

The ratio of

nominal income to nominal potential income is taken as a proxy for
excess demand in product markets; thus an increase in this ratio tends

^^For general surveys of the inflation-unemployment relation
see Laidler and Parkin, "Inflation," pp. 741-809; R. J. Gordon,
"Recent Developments in the Theory of Inflation and Unemployment,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2, 2 (April 1976), pp. 185-219; and
H. Frisch, "Inflation Theory 1963-1975: A ’Second Generation1 Sur
vey ," Journal of Economic Literature, 15, 4 (December 1977), pp.
1289-1317.
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to raise the rate of inflation directly through its effect upon the
final demand for goods and services and indirectly through its effect
upon demand pressure in labor markets.

36

The expected sign of the coefficient on the expected rate
of inflation, jg, is also positive.

As the expected rate of infla

tion rises, economic units will modify their behavior in light of
this expectation and the change in the behavior of these units will
affect the rate of inflation.

For example, as workers anticipate

higher rates of inflation, their wage demands will reflect this
expectation.

Higher rates of wage increase coupled with constant

mark-up pricing in product markets thus imply higher rates of
inflation . ^
Price expectations, equation (3.16), are assumed to be formed
through an adaptive expectations mechanism.

Thus the expected rate

of inflation in the current period is a weighted average of all
previous rates of inflation where the weights are greatest for the
most recent rates of inflation.

In this model we assume 0

<_ 8, < 1.

This assumption insures that the expression has a finite limit and
that the expected inflation rate is more strongly influenced by the
more recent actual rates of inflation.

38

36]?or further development see the references listed in
footnote 35.
3?For further development see the references listed in
footnote 35.
^®The references cited in footnote 35 develop the expec
tations formation mechanism in more detail.
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Equation (3.17) merely defines the price level in period t
as fixed by the price level in the previous period and the current
rate of inflation.

Although the previous price level is exogenous,

the incorporation of the current rate of inflation (which is
endogenous) in the determination of the current price level means
that the current price level is endogenous.
Since the ultimate concern of this study is to analyze the
effects of fiscal policy upon changes in the money supply, the model
described in previous paragraphs will be written in the form of
first differences, a form which will allow direct analysis of changes
in the money supply related to the stance of fiscal policy.

In

first difference form, the equations of the model are

Product Market
(3.11)

dCt = a^(dYt - dT^) + a^ d W E t>

K
(3.2')

(consumption function)

gS

d WE. = d(— £.) + d(_Ji) + dB,.,
*
i*
i*
t
t

(3.3’) dl*. = b,di^
+ b 9d^Y
L
i t— e.
t—1

(wealth definition)

(investment function)

+ b3dYt + V I ^ ,
(3.4')

dE„ = dE ,
t
t

(export function)

(3.5')

dIMt = c^dYt ,

(import function)

(3.6*)

dGt = dGt »

(government expenditure function)
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(3.7')

dTt = rl,t-ldYt + Y t-ldri )t;’

(3.8’)

dYt = dC,. + dl,. + dG + dE - dIM
c
t
t
t
t

(net tax function)

Money Market
(3.9')

dim = f'dM^ + f ’dYt + f 'dpj?,
t

(inverse money demand
function)

(3.10’) dM® = g^di? + g2di°S + g3dUBRt ,
t

(money supply function)

T DS ,
(3.11') d i f .- hdit

(discount rate function)

(3.12’) dUBRt = dUBRt ,

(unborrowed reserves
function)

(3.13')

(term structure of
interest rates function)

hxdi“ + h2dYt ,

(3.14') dM^ = dM=,

(equilibrium condition)

Phillips Curve Relation
(3.15’) dP

c

= j,d(I_) + j2d C-~=)
1
z v POT

+ j3dl> >
J t

(3.16’) d F = (1-Jl) E £n"1dP
, and
c
n=l
t-n

(Phillips Curve function
function)

(price expectations
function)

Aggregate Price Level
(3.17') dPfc = (l+Pt)dPt_1 + (Pt_1)dPt .

IV.

(price level definition)

Government Budget Constraint
The model as specified above has one important omission - the

federal government's budget constraint.

This budget constraint

merely stipulates that government expenditures on goods and services
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plus Interest payments on outstanding debt must be financed In the
current period in some manner, either by tax receipts, sales of
bonds to the private sector, an increase in the monetary base, or
some combination of these methods of finance.

As was pointed out

by Bent Hansen, the particular form of the budget constraint appro
priate to a model depends upon the institutional nature of the system
the model is purported to represent.

39

Hansen separates budget

constraints into two general types - pre-Accord (European type) and
post-Accord (United States type) budget constraints.

Each type of

constraint is now briefly examined and the constraint appropriate
to the model specified above is developed.
The pre-Accord constraint has explicitly been employed in
several macromodels

(3.27)

40

and can be written in the following manner

< i ) d G ® + dBt - Gt - T t +
t

where
39

Hansen, "On the Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy,"

p. 549.
40

See for example, A Blinder and R. Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy
Matter?," Journal of Public Economics, 2, 4 (November 1973), pp. 31937; A. Blinder and R. Solow, "Analytical Foundations of Fiscal Policy,"
in A. Blinder and others, The Economics of Public Finance (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 3-115; C. Christ, "A
Short-Run Aggregate Demand Model of the Interdependence and Effects
of Monetary and Fiscal Policies with Keynesian and Classical Interest
Elasticities," American Economic Review, 57, 2 (May 1967), pp. 434-43;
and C.F.Christ, "A Simple Macroeconomic Model with A Government Budget
Restraint," Journal of Political Economy, 76, 1 (January/February
1968), pp. 53-67.
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1
S
(— r)dG = the change in the nominal value of government bonds held by

±i

the public in period t resulting from Treasury and Federal
Reserve actions, evaluated at the current market price,
dBt

= the change in the nominal monetary base in period t,

Gt

= nominal government purchases of goods and services in

41

period t,
Tt

= nominal net tax receipts in period t, to include subtraction
of interest payments on securities issued to the public

in

period t from net taxes,
and
Dt_^

= the nominal interest payments on outstanding government
securities in the hands of the public at the end of period

This constraint specifies that the deficit (Gt - T t) plus interest
payments on outstanding debt from the previous period must be
41

Note that this differs from the change in the market value
of outstanding bonds which is given by d(Gs/i^)t .
42

This formulation of the pre-Accord constraint implicity
assumes that Treasury balances are constant during this period. As
was noted in a previous section of this chapter (Direct Links Between
Fiscal Policy and the Money Supply), changes in Treasury balances
have a trivial effect upon reserves and the monetary base (see pp. 33-35).
For this reason, changes in Treasury balances will not be incorporated
into this constraint.
The particular form of the constraint also
abstracts from foreign transactions and their effects upon the mone
tary base. Changes in foreign balances at the Federal Reserve are
typically thought of as a transaction that the Federal Reserve off
sets (at least partly) in its open-market operations.
(See Lombra
and Torto, "Federal Reserve," pp. 47-55.)
For this reason, foreign
transactions are excluded from the budget constraint.
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financed by issuance of new securities and/or an increase in the
monetary base.
Although this constraint has been utilized in some macro
models of the United States economy, the appropriateness of this
constraint for the United States economy given the current institu
tional division between fiscal and monetary policymaking authorities
is questionable.

A budget constraint of the pre-Accord type implies

an institutional structure where fiscal and monetary policymaking
are centered in one authority (as is found in some European countries)
or a structure with separate policy authorities where one authority
is under the thumb of the other (the United States in the pre-Treasury
Federal Reserve Accord period).

The coordination of monetary and

fiscal policy and hence the division of the total required financing
between security issues to the public and changes in the monetary
base is facilitated by either of these institutional settings.
However, the institutional nature of macro policymaking in
the United States changed after the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord
of 1951.

As was noted in an earlier section of this chapter, the

Accord has been interpreted as freeing the Federal Reserve to con
duct monetary policy ao as to achieve the goals specified in the
Employment Act of 1946.

43

An important implication of the Accord is

that any change in the monetary base is ultimately at the discretion
43„
See pp. 38-39 of this chapter.
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of the Federal Reserve.

The implied single authority coordination of

both fiscal and monetary policy found in the pre-Accord constraint is
inappropriate in a period of time in which the authority to conduct
monetary and fiscal policy is vested in independent decision making
units.

It would thus seem that a constraint that recognizes the

institutional realities of the post-Accord period would be appro
priate for a macro-model of the United States after 1951.

Because

of this institutional change, Hansen’s post-Accord constraint is
employed in the remainder of the analysis in this paper.
The post-Accord budget constraint can be written as

(3.28)

4

)dGt ’F - 5t - T t + Dt-1
t

where
1
S F
(— r)dG * = the nominal value of securities issued in period t by the
fiscal authority, evaluated at the current market price,
and the other elements in the constraint are as previously defined.
This constraint specifies that a change in the deficit plus the
interest payments on outstanding debt at the end of the previous
period is financed entirely by an issue of new securities to the
public.

44

As noted earlier, we may observe a concurrent increase in

the monetary base, but presumably, this increase in the monetary base
is undertaken at the discretion of the Federal Reserve and is not an
44

The assumptions made in footnote 41 also apply to this
budget constraint.
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automatic response to the financing requirements of the fiscal
authority.
Since the post-Accord constraint differs from the pre-Accord
constraint by the elimination of the automatic response of the mone
tary authority, a constraint for the monetary authority must be added
to a model which adopts a post-Accord constraint for the fiscal
authority.

The constraint for the monetary authority can be derived

from the sources and uses of the monetary base statement for the
Federal Reserve.

The sources side of this statement can be summarized

by B t =

where
B t = nominal monetary base,

(-L)g S>M
^SL t
= nominal value of Federal Reserve holdings of government
t
securities,
A
X

t
t

= discounts and advances, and
= summary variable which includes positive values for float
the gold stock, SDRs, and Treasury currency outstanding
and negative values for Treasury deposits at the Federal
Reserve, foreign deposits at the Federal Reserve, Treasury
cash holdings, and other liabilities and capital accounts.

From the sources side, the change in B can be written as
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The uses side of the statement can be written as
Bfc « UBRt + BRt + Ct
where
BRt « borrowed reserves (s A fc) and all other variables are as pre
viously defined.
From the uses side the change in B is given by

(3.29)

dBt = dUBRt + dCt + dAt .

Utilizing the necessary equality between a change in the
sources and the uses of the monetary base, we can write

(~ T )dGt*M + ^ t + dXt " dUBRt + dCt +
At
Rearranging, we obtain

(3.30)

(~T)dGB »M » dUBR
.X,
t
t
t

+ d a - dX„.
t
t

This equation can thus be interpreted as the constraint for the
monetary authority.
The first difference form of the model can be completed by
the addition of the following equations

(3.28)

(-±r)dG=-F - G t - T t + D ^ ,

(3.29)

dBt = dUBRt + dCt + dAt ,

1
s
where (— r)dG = the change in the nominal value of government securi
it
ties evaluated at current market prices in the hands of the public
and all other variables are as previously defined.
Equation (3.28) is the budget constraint of the fiscal
authority, and equation (3.30) is the budget constraint of the
Federal Reserve.

Equation (3.29) is merely a definition derived

from the sources and uses statement for the monetary base.
(3.31)

Equation

specifies that the change in the nominal value of government

seucrities in the hands of the public evaluated at current market
prices is the difference between the nominal value of the change
in securities issued by the fiscal authority and the change in the
nominal value of government securities held by the Federal Reserve,
again evaluated at current market prices.
The budget constraints just developed are linked to the rest
of the model through the wealth equation.

The wealth equation in

first difference form was written as

(3.2’)

GS
dWEt = d £ | ) + d(-|) + dBt .
it

it

Expanding the differential of this equation, we obtain
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K
d«Et - ( i ) d K t - ( - £ > a i j + ( i ) d G S -

h

*t

+ dBt .

*t

*t

Substituting the relationships specified in equations (3.28), (3.29),
(3.30) and (3.31) into equation (3.2’) we obtain
K
GS
dHEt - ( i ) d K t - ( - £ ) « * - ( - ^ d i * + [Gc - T t +
t

t

- dUBR - dC£

t

+ dX£ ] + [dUBRt + dCt + dAt].

Rearranging this equation, we obtain a final expression for the change
in net wealth which is substituted for equation (3.2') in the model

(3.2")

dWEt - Gt - T t + D t
K
-

+ dXt + dAt + ( - p - ) d K t

GS .

..

t “ 1

E<Tir> + <7 5 ^ K 1

45

,

_ 1

t-i

it-i

In order to preserve the linearity of the model, the terms

(~^)dKt and [(Kt/ i ^ ) + (G^/i^)]di^ will be approximated by (— ^ — )
it

1
—
—
92
Q
P2
P
(— j— )dKfc and [(Kt_-j_/it_i) + ^ t - l ^ t - l ^ ^ t ’

1t-i
aPProx:I-mat::i-on does

1 t-l
not alter the basic conclusions of the model and is merely a discrete
approximation to a continuous process.
Futhermore, the expressions
G. i + dG. and T. . + r. . .dYfc + Y. .dr. . will be substituted for
_t-l
t
t- 1
l,t-l t
t- 1
l,t
Gt and Tt> respectively, in equation (3.2") since the policy variables

of interest are dG„ and Y„ .dr.
t
t- 1
l,t

75

V.

Solution of the Complete Model
The IS-LM model can now be solved to obtain reduced form

equations for dYfc and di™.

The reduced form equation for di® is

employed in the next section to obtain a reduced form equation for
the money supply.
Combining and rearranging equations (3.1'), (3.2"), (3.3'),
(3.4'), (3.51), (3.61), (3.7’), (3.8'), and (3.13'), we obtain the
following IS equation

<3'32)

dYt " ^

{(l+*2>d5t - (al + a2 > V l drl,t + a2'«t-l - Tt-1
K

+ » t- i + “ t + “ t + ^
1

> dEt ] - a 2 h i ”
t-l

7

ir>
t- 1

GS

+

- bldit-2 + V
1

Yt-l + V

Yt-l + dit>>

t-l

where
K

G

A0 " (1 "al+alrl,t-l+a 2 rl,t-l+a2h2 [

]“b3+cl} *
1

t-l

1

t-l

Combining and rearranging equations (3.9"), (3.10'), (3.11'),
(3.12'), and (3.141), we obtain the following LM equation

O . 33)

di™ = i{f{g2dlf - fJgjdOTR,. + q d v t + f'dP*},

where
A1 ■

( 1

+ fjgj)-
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Solving equations (3.32) and (3.33) simultaneously, we obtain
m
the following reduced form equations for dYfc and dit

0.34)

<Ht = i { A 3 dGt - A ^ d r ^

+ A , [ G ^ - T ^ + D ^ + d X ^

+ (-f-)dK,] - A6dit
*_2 + A?dYt_1 + A g d l ^ + A9dEt
1

t“l

- A10dI“

+ A lld® \

" A12®t>

and

(3.35)

dlj = ^ A

1 3

dGt - A li,Yt. 1 dr1>t + A 1S [ G ^ - T ^ ^ d d A , .

+ ( T ^ ) d K t ) - A 16diA.2 + A17dYt.1 + A18dlt.1 + A 19dlt
1

t-l

+ A20dIf

- A21d® t

+ A2 2 « t }"

where

K

GS

A2 " {1“al+alrl,t-l+a2rl,t-l+a2h2 [(ri2“ )+(Tl2”^ ~ b3+Cl)
1

K
±t-l

A3

= (l+a2 )(l+f{gl) ,

A4 = (ai+a 2 ^

1

+f{Si) »

A 5 = a2^1 +fi 8 l^»

1

t-l

t-l

t-

1
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A 6

" bi^ 1 +fi 8 i^»

A 7

■ b 2 (l+f;*g1),

A 8

" b 4 (l+f»8l),

A g = (l+f{8l) ,
“ tA 1 0

A 1 1

“ a 2 hl^'

t-

) + (■ £2

£ 2

it-

t-

K

S
t-

t-

" a 2 hl [(',£2 ) + (- £2 •)]fjg3 ,
tLtK

A 1 2

= a 2 hl t(

£ 2

) + ("

t(l+a2 ) f ’,

13

A14 = (al+a2)f2 ’
15

a 2 f2 ’

16

blf 2 *

17

b2f2»

\L8

b4f2 ’

19

f 2

20

A 0

*

A 0 (fj!g3), and

21
A22

*

"

S
t-

£
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VI.

Derivation of the Reduced Form Money Supply Equation and Analysis
of the Effects of Fiscal Policy Upon the Money Supply
The results obtained in the preceding section can be combined

with the money supply equation to obtain a reduced form equation for
the money supply.

Combining and rearranging equations (3.10') and

(3.35), we obtain the following reduced form money supply equation

(3.36)

dM* . g1 C ^ ) d G t -

+ Dt

+ dXt + dAt + ( - f - ) d K t ) -

+

8 1

_ 1

1

^■t-l

+ t«3 -

( ^ Z )dY t

_ 1

+

All variables and coefficients are as previously defined.
The effects of fiscal policy upon changes in the money supply
can now be determined by examining the partial derivatives of dM^
with respect to an exogenous change in government expenditures
(dG ) and an exogenous change in tax receipts (Y .dr
). These
t
u"*J. 1 )U
partial derivatives are given by
3dM8
(3.37)

3

dGfc " 81 A 13^A 2

3dM?
(3.38)

3Y

t-

dr“
1

1

" 8 1

,t

A 14/A 2 *

and
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To determine the signs of these drivatives we need to
examine the elements in each expression.

Let us first examine the

term A 2 = { (l-ai+a1 r 1 }t_ 1 +a 2 r1 }t_ 1 -a 2 h2 [

]-b3+ Cl) ( 1 + f ^ )
±t-l

t-

1

K
GS
+ q c a h [<-i=i)+c_£ji)m.
it-i

1

t-i

Based upon the previous discussion of the individual equations of the
model, the elements of A 2 are assumed to have the following signs
and magnitudes

0

< a^ <

1

,

0

<a2 <

K
qS
(— |zl.) > 0, (—
t-

1

t-

1

,

>0,

0

< r^ <

1

, h2

>

0

, b3 >

0

, c-^ >

0

,

f^ > 0, g^ > 0, f^ > 0, and h^ > 0.

The

1

term (l-a1 +a 1 rljt._1 +a 2 rljt_1 -a2 h 2 [(-^l)+(^zi.)]-b 3 +c1) Is >
t(1 +alrX,t-l+a 2 rl,t-l+cl) > (al+a 2 h 2 t(%
1

t-

1

i)+(%
t-l

0

if

1

i)]+b 3 ) -

theoretical

±t-l

and empirical evidence tends to support the direction of this
i n e q u a l i t y h e n c e , we will assume that the term (1 -a^+a^r^
R
+ a2rl t-l"a2 ^ 2 ^ ‘
*
j

£ 2

t-

1

gS
t"^)3"bo+c ) > 0.
j£ 2
i
t- 1

Since f I and

are > 0,

See for example, Branson, Macroeconomic Theory and Policy,
pp. 169-226, 267-318, and E. Kuh and R. L. Schmalensee, An Intro
duction to Applied Macroeconomics (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub
lishing Co., 1973), pp. 31-101, 175-83.
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the term (l+f£g^) is also > 0.

The product of this term and the

previously discussed term is thus >

>

0

we can conclude that A£ >
The sign of

0

0

.

K
Since f '(a„h- [(— JiziL)+(_£“ L) ])
2
2
1
M
M
t- 1
t“l

.^

can now be determined.

Since A,, =

3dGt
(l+agjfg and since a 2 >

that

= g
3dGt

manner:

> 0.

and A 2

are all positive, we see

This result can be explained in the' following

A2

An increase in dGt , ceteris paribus, directly stimulates

aggregate demand and necessitates issuance of more bonds by the
fiscal authority.

The bond financing increases net wealth and

further stimulates aggregate demand.

The mode of financing and

the increase in aggeegate demand put upward pressure upon the
interest rate.

The interest rate increase leads to adjustments

in the non-bank public's holdings of currency, demand and time
deposits and in commercial banks holdings of excess reserves and
borrowings from the Federal Reserve.

As a result of these adjust

ments, the policy variable multiplier rises and, with a given
level of the policy variable, the money supply rises.

The rise in

interest rates also tends to mitigate or even to offset the increase
in net wealth and thus tends to reduce the initial increase in
aggregate demand and hence interest rates.

Whether this effect

/7
We should note that this conclusion is based upon theo
retical and empirical studies such as those cited in footnote 46.
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offsets the stimulatory effect of the initial change in G and
bonds outstanding is an empirical question; however, evidence
from macroeconometric models of the United States economy suggests
that the initial stimulatory effect of dG > 0 is not offset by the
interest rate effect upon net wealth.^®
Thus

3dM§
E = g-A-o/A- represents the change in the money
3dGt

supply induced by private sector response to higher interest rates
brought about by the increase in income and net wealth attributable
to the increase in government purchases of goods and services.
meaning of the term
following manner:

The

^2 or (1 +^ 2 )^ 2 ^ ^ 2 can **e explained in the
(1 +a 2 ) M

2

represents the change in income asso

ciated with a one unit change in government expenditures and the
term C l + a 2 ^ 2 ^ 2 rePresents

change in the short-term market

interest rate as a result of the change in income.

Since g^ is the

coefficient on di™ in the money supply equation, the entire expres
sion represents the change in the money supply as a result of the
change in government expenditures.
The expansionary effect of the increase in government expen
ditures upon the money supply can also be explained graphically in
the context of the money market.

The increase in government

^®See for example, G. V. L. Narasimham, "Policy Multipliers
in a Quarterly Econometric Model of the U.S. Economy," Southern
Economic Journal, 43, 4 (April 1977), pp. 1486-1504; and N. N.
Choudhry, "Integration of Fiscal and Monetary Sectors in Econo
metric Models: A Survey of Theoretical Issues and Empirical
Findings," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 23, 2 (July
1976), pp. 395-440.

expenditure, as noted before, leads to an increase in income.
The rise in income stimulates the demand for money.
strated in Figure I
M 0

Ml*

t 0

This is illu

by the shift in the money demand curve from

Private sector response to the initial disequilibrium

in the money market leads to a movement along the

curve until

equilibrium is restored at a higher interest rate (i^) and an
increased money supply (M^).

Figure I
Fiscal Policy Effects Upon the Money Supply

The sign of 3dM^/3Y

g^ >

0

, A^

= (a^+agjf^

clusion that 3dM?/3Y
c
the following manner:

>

,dr

0

dr.
will now be analyzed.
X jt

t—1

, and A 2

l,t

< 0.

>

0

, we are led

Since

to the con

This result can be explained in

An increase in Y t_^dr^ ^ ceteris paribus,

reduces disposable income and hence aggregate demand.

This change

also reduces the size of the deficit to be financed or perhaps
generates a surplus.

The reduction in aggregate demand, and the
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potential debt retirement, puts downward pressure upon interest
rates.

The fall in interest rates induces adjustments by banks

and the non-bank public that reduce the policy variable multiplier
and hence the money supply.

The fall in interest rates tends to

raise net wealth and thus mitigates the decline in aggregate
demand.

However, evidence from econometric models again suggests

that the effect upon income and interest rates is not reversed by
\
this wealth e f f e c t . ^
3Mt
=---- = -gi A,,/Ao as the change in
We can interpret ----14 2
the money supply induced by private sector response to lower
interest rates brought about by the reduction in income induced
by the contractionary tax changes.

(a,+a9)
The term — ±— =— represents

a2
the change in income induced by a unit change in taxes and
(an+a 9 ) f *
— ±— =— £. represents the change in interest rates as a result of

A2
the change in money demand stemming from the change in income.

In

Figure I, this conclusion is illustrated by the shift in money demand
from

to

as income falls and the movement down the money supply

curve to i™ and M 2 .

49see the references cited in footnote 48.
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VII.

Conclusion
We thus conclude that in the context of the macroeconomic

model developed in this chapter, and given widely held perceptions
about the signs and magnitudes of the structural coefficients in
the model, a change in government expenditures leads to a change
in the money supply in the same direction and a change in the
exogenous component of tax receipts leads to a change in the money
\

supply in the opposite direction.

The changes in the money supply

examined in this chapter stem solely from private sector response
to changes in income and interest rates resulting from a change in
fiscal policy.

The Federal Reserve and its policy tools were

assumed to be exogenous,that is, the Federal Reserve was presumed
not to respond systematically to the movements in such variables
as income and interest rates that evoked private sector response.
The next chapter will examine the effects of fiscal policy upon
changes in the money supply when

Federal Reserve actions are

endogenous to the model. The conclusions about the effects of
fiscal policy upon the money supply when Federal Reserve behavior
is endogenous are then contrasted with the money supply effects
examined in this chapter.

CHAPTER IV

MONETARY EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY WHEN
FEDERAL RESERVE BEHAVIOR IS ENDOGENOUS

I.

Introduction
The previous chapter examined the fiscal policy effects

upon the money supply under the presumption that monetary policy
was exogenous.

Federal Reserve policymakers were assumed not to

systematically react to the current movement of economic variables
and to the current stance of fiscal policy; thus, any change in
the money supply related to fiscal policy resulted from portfolio
and spending adjustments by commercial banks and the non-bank
public.

However, if Federal Reserve policymakers respond to current

movements in macroeconomic variables, then treatment of monetary
policy as exogenous is inappropriate, and monetary policy should
be considered endogenous.
The appropriateness of treating the Federal Reserve as
endogenous is supported by policy statements issued by Federal
Reserve officials and by the empirical studies cited in Chapter II. ^

For example, the FOMC policy directive to the System Open
Market Account manager contains references to the current and expec
ted future movements of macroeconomic variables and to the reserve,
monetary aggregate, and money market conditions required to move the
macroeconomic variables toward the positions desired by the Federal
Reserve.
The November 15, 1977 domestic policy directive contains
the following evidence of Federal Reserve concern with macroeconomic
variables:
M . . . in light of the foregoing developments, it is
the policy of the Federal Open Market Committee to foster bank
85
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As was mentioned in previous chapters, monetary policy will be
made endogenous in this study by postulating that the monetary
authorities act as if they were minimizing a loss function which
contains as arguments the weighted squared differences between
actual and desired states of macroeconomic variables of expressed
concern to Federal Reserve policymakers subject to the policy
makers’ perception of the structure of the economy.

The remainder

of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the particular form
of the Federal Reserve loss function and to the derivation of a
policy reaction function for the Federal Reserve.

This reaction

function relates the Federal Reserve policy variable to exogenous
and lagged endogenous variables from the macroeconomic model

reserve and other financial conditions that will encourage con
tinued economic expansion and help resist inflationary pressures,
while contributing to a sustainable pattern of international
transaction . . . ." This statement is taken from "Record of
Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee," Federal
Reserve Bulletin, 64 (January 1978), p. 25. Similar statements
can be found in other issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, or
in any recent issue of the Annual Report of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
For examples of empirical studies supporting the concept
of an endogenous monetary policy, see J. H. Wood," A Model of
Federal Reserve Behavior," in G. Horwich, ed., Monetary Process
and Policy (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1967), pp. 135-66;
A. F. Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals in the Postwar Period: A
Study in Revealed Preference," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 1
(February 1973), pp. 25-43; R.T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogeniety of
Monetary Policy." Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2 (July 1974), pp. 175-88;
T. Havrilesky, "A Test of Monetary Policy Action," Journal of Political Economy, 75, 3 (June 1967), pp. 299-304; T. Havilesky, R. M.
Sapp, and R. L. Schweitzer, "Tests of the Federal Reserve's Reaction
to the State of the Economy 1964-74," Social Science Quarterly 55, 4
(March 1975), pp. 835-52; and M. W. Keran and C. T. Babb, "An Expla
nation of Federal Reserve Actions (1933-68)," Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review, 51, 7 (July 1969), pp. 7-20.
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formulated in the previous chapter and to desired values for the
arguments in the loss function.

The policy reaction function is

then incorporated into the macroeconomic model and a reduced form
equation for the money supply is derived.

The reduced form money

supply equation is then employed in the analysis of the effects of
fiscal policy upon the money supply when monetary policy is
endogenous.

II .

The Federal Reserve Loss Function
The form of the loss function employed in this study is a

static quadratic function without interaction terms.

The loss

function contains as arguments the weighted squared current period
deviations of actual from desired values for real GNP, the rate of
inflation, the balance of trade, and the short-term interest rate.
The arguments included in the loss function are drawn from policy
statements by Federal Reserve officials and are similar to the
arguments in previous reaction function studies.

2

The quadratic

loss function is employed here as in approximation to the "true"
loss function of the Federal Reserve policymakers, although there
are certain well known problems encountered with this particular
3

form of the loss function.

Despite these problems, the quadratic

O
ASee the references cited in footnote

1

of this chapter.

^One problem with a quadratic loss function noted by Wood,
"A Model of Federal Reserve Behavior," p. 139 is the implicit
assumption that the same level of loss is associated with an actual
value of an argument that exceeds a desired value by a certain
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function is used in this study because of its widespread usage
in estimating policy reaction functions, because this type of loss
function produces linear policy reaction functions, and because
the relative weights in the loss function can be readily determined.
The following quadratic loss function is postulated as
representative of the Federal Reserve's preferences

(4.1)

it = w ^ d C ^ t ) - dy *

) 2

+ w 2 (dPt - dP *

) 2

+ w 3 (dBTt - dBT *

) 2

t

Pt
+ w 4 (di™ - di™*)2 ,

where
= level of loss in period t,
Y fc

= nominal output

Pt

= price level in

in period t,
period t,

d(— £) = actual change in real output from t-

1

to t,

Pt
dy*

= desired change in real output

from t-

dPt

= actual change in rate of

dP*

= desired change in rate of inflation from t-1 to t,

1

to

inflation from t-

t,
1

to t,

amount as is associated with the actual value below the desired
value by the same amount.
Other problems with the quadratic approach have been
enumerated by Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals," p . 26, and
include the following observations:
(1 ) the desired values of
the arguments in the disutility function must be attainable, and
(2 ) empirical estimates of the weights are sensitive to the
deviations of actual from desired values.
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dBTt = actual change in balance of trade from t-

1

to t,

dBT* = desired change in balance of trade from t-1 to t,
di™

= actual change in short-term interest rate from t-

to t, and

1

di™* = desired change in short-term interest rate from t-

1

to t.

are measures of the traditionally stated goals of monetary and fiscal
policy.

The balance of trade is utilized here as a proxy for

Federal Reserve concern with the balance-of-payments since, unlike
the balance of trade, the balance of payments is not endogenous to
the model developed earlier.

The term (di™ - di™*)^ is included

to capture Federal Reserve concern for orderly conditions in finan
cial markets (taken here as the absence of large changes in market
interest rates) and for the avoidance of the disruptive effects of
disintermediation felt in some sectors of the economy, especially
the housing sector.
It should be noted that all of the arguments in the loss
function are in the form of current period changes.

This formula

tion of the loss function thus implies that the Federal Reserve's
time horizon is one period long.

Since the basic period of interest

in this study is a quarter and since the policy making process at
the Federal Reserve begins with the development of four-quarter
forecasts for output, inflation, unemployment, and other economic
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variables by the s t a f f t h e focus upon current period deviations
in this chapter may be questioned.

For example, if the Federal

Reserve had a four-quarter horizon the loss function might be
formulated in the following manner

+

S w _ .(dBT
- dBT* J
i= 0
3x
t+i
t+i

2

+ w, (di™ - di"1*)2 .
4
t
t

In this formulation the Federal Reserve is concerned with current
period deviations and with forecasted deviations for the next three
quarters for real output, the inflation rate, and the balance of
trade.

Current period deviations are considered sufficient only

for financial market stability.*’
While the employment of a four-quarter loss function appears
to be in line with stated policy procedures, the significance of
utilizing this function depends upon the relative weights assigned
by the Federal Reserve to future peiod deviations.

If the future

^For a description of the policy making process at the
Federal Reserve, see R. L. Lombra and R. G. Torto, "The Strategy
of Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Monthly
Review. September/October 1975, pp. 3-14; and J. L. Pierce,
"Quantitative Analysis for Decisions at the Federal Reserve,"
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 3, 1 (1974), pp. 11-19.
-*A formulation of this type is consistent with the policy
making process described in the references in footnote 4 of this
chapter.
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period weights are significant relative to the current period
weights, then the multi-period loss function is appropriate.
However, if the future period weights are insignificant relative
to the current period weights, then the multi-period loss function
is inappropriate.

Some evidence on the relative significance of

the weights in a multi-period function has been provided by
£
Friedlaender.

Friedlaender found that in a two-quarter framework

the second quarter weights were insignificant relative to the
current quarter weights.

These results are suggestive that a one-

period disutility function is adequate to describe the preferences
of the Federal Reserve.
Furthermore,

even though the Federal Reserve employs fore

casts of economic activity for

the next four to six quarters in its

policy making process, a reading of FOMC directives leaves one
uncertain about how far into the future the Federal Reserve's
concern extends.

For example, in a discussion of the FOMC directive,

Axilrod asserts:

Generally, only the statement about over-all economic
activity had a future cast to it. But the time horizon
for this future was often rather indefinite.
Sometimes
the wording has been such that the reader would think
it referred to no more than a quarter ahead, or to the
quarter in process.
An example of such wording would
be "economic activity appears to be slowing." On the

^Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals," p. 27.
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other hand, at times statements simply noted that
economic activity is projected to slow.
In such
_
cases the time horizon appears more indefinite, (p. 3)

It is thus often difficult to determine the exact length of
the Federal Reserve's time horizon for policymaking.

Furthermore,

based upon the results obtained by Friedlaender, the widespread
usage of the one-period approach in the reaction-function litera
ture, and the difficulty of determining the exact length of the
appropriate time horizon, a one-period function will be employed
in this study as representative of the Federal Reserve's
preferences

III.

The Federal Reserve Policy Reaction Function
The derivation of the policy reaction function can be

facilitated by employing matrix algebra.

The loss function can

be written in matrix form as

A = (Yt-Y£)'W(Yt-Y*)
where
Y

= nxl vector of actual values of the arguments in the loss
function and n equals the number of arguments,

7 S. H.
Axilrod, "The FOMC Directive As Structured in the
Late 1960's: Theory and Appraisal," in Open Market Policies and
Operating Procedures - Staff Studies (Washington, D.C.: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 1971), pp. 1-36.

Q
Statistical considerations may also influence the choice of
the time horizon if the reaction function is to be empirically esti
mated. A multi-period horizon may, by reducing the available
degrees of freedom, increase the degree of multicollinearity to
such an extent that the estimated coefficients are unreliable.
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Y* = nxl vector of desired values of the arguments in the loss
function, and
W

= nxn diagonal matrix of positive weights in the loss function.

9

In the approach taken in this study, the Federal Reserve is
assumed to minimize
the U.S. economy.

a subject to its perception of the structure of
In matrix form the structure of the economy can

be written as

Y t = JRt + HZt where

R t = lxl vector of the Federal Reserve policy variable,
J

= nxl vector of coefficients on the policy variable,
=

H

mxl vector of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables, and

= nxm matrix of coefficients on the variables in Z

t

9

For more detailed definitions of these matrices and the
matrices defined in the next paragraph, see Appendix One: Matrix
Derivation of the Federal Reserve Policy Reaction Function.
■^This formulation of the Federal Reserve's constraint implies
that the policymaker knows the structure of the economy with cer
tainty.
In actuality the structure is not known with certainty.
However, Theil's certainty equivalence theorem states that as long
as the policymaker optimizes with respect to the expected values of
the stochastic variables (the elements of Y fc) , the solution is the
same as if all uncertainty had been disregarded, as has been done
here.
For a proof of this see H. Theil, Economic Forecasts and
Policy, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1961),
pp. 414-7.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the policymaker acts as if
the multipliers between the policy variable and the elements of Y t
are known with certainty.
For a discussion of this assumption, see
W. Brainard, "Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy," American
Economic Review, 57, 2 (May 1967), pp. 411-25.

The minimization problem can be solved by substituting
Y fc = JRt + HZ£ into the loss function, expanding the resulting
expression, taking the partial derivative of this expression
with respect to Rt , and then solving the resulting first-order
condition for R...

Substituting JR.. + HZ into
L
t

I = (Y L-Y*)
*W(Y -Y*),
C
U t

we obtain

a = (JR.. + HZ. - Y * ) ’W(JR. + HZ.. - Y*)
^

t

t

t

t

t

Expanding this expression we obtain

A = (JR..) fW(JR )+2(JR ) 'W(HZ )-2(JR. ) 'WY*+(HZ ) 'W(HZ )-2(HZ ) 'WY*
L
t
t
L
L
u
+

y

*'w y *.

Taking the partial derivative of 5. with respect to Rt and setting
it equal to zero, we obtain

u

= 2 J ’WJRt + 2J'WHZt - 2J'WY* = 0 or

3R.t

M.
3R

= J ’WJR. + J'WHZ. - J'WY* = 0
t
t
t

Solving this equation for R t , we obtain

The equation Rfc = [J'WJ]“ V w Y *

- [J'WJ]

” 1

J'WHZt relates

the Federal Reserve's policy tool to desired values of the arguments
in the loss function and to exogenous and lagged endogenous
variables from the macro model.

This equation can thus be inter

preted as the Federal Reserve's policy reaction function.

After

performing the necessary matrix manipulations, the policy reaction
function can be rewritten in the following form

(4.3)

d(IBRt = -V 0

- V 1 dGt + V 2 Y t. 1 drlit - T j t G ^ -

+ dXt + dAt + C - f - ) d K t ] + V 4 di *
1

" V 6 dlt-

- VlldYt0
where
1

1

- V 5 dV t

_ 1

t~l

- V 7dlt + V 8 dIf

1

. 2

+ V

+ V12d^t + V 13d^

Bt + V1

0

d(^ >

- V14dBTt - V1 5 < * '
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A1 1 A1
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2
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A 2A11S3

'10

’

S 2

A 2A11A4

'11

S2
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w 1A 2A1 1 (p 7

t-

T +A25)
1

'12

V

w 2 A 2 Aiij2 ( pot^
t- 1
13

W 3A 2A11c1
'14
V

S2
w4A 2A 21

15

’

S 2

c
1

"

/ 1 .. N2 , .2/ 1 x2 ,
2
25
W2^2 yPOT
W 3C1

1 (“

t-

Y t-

1

S2 “ A11S1 +

w 4A 2 1 *
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53 " WljlA 24(P T 7 fA25) + W 2^1^2^YPOT^ ’
t"A
t- 1
Y

Y

54 " wlA24(P r 7 +A25)(7 0 T ) + W2^ ^.POT^ ’
t “ 1

A2

3

Yt-

1

Yt-

1

= ( ^ i ) a + p t)dPt.i,
Pt-

1

Y t- 1
A 24 - (d H 1 )pt - r
p t-l
Y tA 25 “ ( 2
Pt-

1

*P t-lJ 2»
1

A 26 = A 24j3 ’
and all other terms are as previously defined.
Although the change in the monetary policy instrument is a
linear function of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables and
of the desired values of the arguments in the loss function, the
coefficients of the independent variables are complex mixtures
of structural parameters and weights in the policymakers' loss
function.

A shift in either the structural parameters or in the

relative weights in the loss function will lead to a change in the
implied magnitude or, perhaps, in the sign of the coefficients in
the policy reaction function.

For example, de-emphasis upon finan

cial market stability and increased emphasis upon the deviation of
the actual change in real output from the desired change in real
output or upon the deviation of the actual inflation rate from the
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desired rate will change the size and perhaps the sign of the
coefficients on dGt and Y £_^dr^ ^ and will thereby change the
implied response of the monetary policymakers to a change in
government expenditures or tax receipts.

The responsiveness of

the money supply to a change in these variables will also be
altered as a result of a shift in preferences by monetary
policymakers.

IV.

Derivation of the Reduced Form Money Supply Equation and
Analysis of the Effects of Fiscal Policy Upon the Money Supply
The policy reaction function can now be combined with the

structural model to derive a reduced form equation for the money
supply.

Substituting equation (4,3) and (3,35) (the reduced form equa

tion of di^) into equation (3.10') (the money supply equation), we
obtain the following reduced form money supply equation

dMt - H 0 + H idEt - H 2 Y t-idr1 ,t + V

V

r

t

A

i

W

i

K
it-l

- V dt-2 + H5dV l + H6dIt-l + H7dSt + H8ddf + V Bt
- H10d^ > + HlldYt°T + »12d^ + »13«? + HU dBT? ' H15di?*
where

Ho = - FV
A1
H 1

3

= B l A f - rV

1
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" gl i f - * V

H 2

H3 ’ %

j f - ^3-

»5 " *1 i f - * V

He ■

h i f ~ FV

H7

8 1

H 8

gl A 2° '

A2

" ^ 7 ’

H 9 - 8l l f

H 1 0

™

H 1 1

= -FV 1

H 1 2

"

H1

H

3

14

1 0

^12*

= FV.
13’
FV

’ CT9-

>

1

14’

rV6 >

>
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H15 = **15’

A91
F

=(

3 - gl^ ) .

8

and the V's and the g's are as previously defined.
S
The partial derivatives of dMt with respect to dGt and
Y

dr..
can now be determined.
t" J, X ^t

These partial derivatives are

given by

=

R1 A13 - (g3 - gx k 21)Vlt

3dGt

A2

A2

and

9dM?
aY
^ t-

a1
dr
1

l,t

" [Sl

a2

4

A 2
2

~

( S 3

~

6 1

A 2
2

1

)V2l‘

The signs of these derivatives depend in a complex way upon the
structural parameters of the model and the relative weights on the
arguments in the policymakers' loss function; evaluation of the
signs requires as a starting point some assumptions about the
relative weights in the loss function.
Let us evaluate 3dM^/3dGt first.

This partial derivative

can be rewritten as

A 21 w j. „ A13
-S3V1 + gl X f V1 + gl A 2
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As a starting point in the evaluation of the sign of this derivative,
the sign of (-V ), the coefficient on dGt in the policy reaction
function, will be analyzed.

(-V^) can be written as

rA 1 1 A 3 S 1 -w 4 A 2 1 A 1
0

“I

3

i

J•

s 2

2
2
S 2 , in expanded form, equals A ^ S ^ + w ^ A ^ .

is equal to

Y

wl[p—

+ (“ 2

^Pt-1^2^2 + W2^2^POT^2 + W3C1^*

t- 1
t- 1
Y
(-|zi)Pt_ 1 j2 ]2 , j 2 (-JL_)2 , and c 2 are >
P t-

Since A

1

> 0.

~

+

t _ 1

0

and since w ^

w 2> and w 3

Y t- 1

1

are > 0, S, is > 0.
S3

Since tp

2
1 1

Thus since S 2

2
and A 0, are > 0 and S. and w# are > 0,
2 1

H

1

’

is > 0, for (-V^) to be > 0 (thereby implying

that the Federal Reserve increases any change in the level of its
policy instrument in response to an increase in government expen
diture) the term “ [A^jA-jS^ - w 4 ^ 2 l^i 3 ^ must be > 0.
alternatively,

[w 4A2i^i3 “ ^ H ^ 3 S1^ must be > 0.

Stated

For this inequality

At 1 Ao
to hold, W / A ^ A . , must be > A.-A-S. or w, >
* 21 13
11 3 1
4

A

n

A

l 3

- S..
1

Thus if the weight assigned by the Federal Reserve to
financial market stability exceeds the sum of the weights on all
other arguments in the loss function where this sum is preA-i 1
Ao
multiplied by the ratios (7 — ) (7 — ), (-V,) will be > 0.
"21
13

Since g~

(the coefficient on dUBRt in the money supply function - see
equation (3.10') is > 0, if (-V^) is > 0, then the money supply
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change will be positive as a result of dGt > 0.

The term

is the ratio of the coefficient on dUBRt in the reduced form equation
for dYfc (equation (3.34)) and the coefficient on dUBRt in the reduced
form equation for di™ (equation (3.35)), respectively.

The term

(Ag/A^g) is the ratio of the coefficient on dGt in the reduced
form equation for dYfc and the coefficient on dGt in the reduced
form equation for di™, respectively.
exceed
are >

The extent to which w^ must

depends upon the values of these ratios.

If the ratios

then w^ must be greater in absolute terms than if the ratios

1

are < 1.

Evidence from a model of the U.S. economy similar to the

one developed in this study suggests that these ratios are both
> 1.11
The second term in the partial derivative is more complex
to interpret.

This term can be rewritten as

Af)f 1
S3V1

Si

2
after substituting AQ(f^g^) for

k ^ and rearranging.

As noted

earlier g 3 V^ represents the policy induced change in the money
supply.

Since the model employed in this study requires that the

quantity of money demanded equals the quantity of money supplied
in every period, g^V-i
1

a2

represents the change in i"? required
c

l^Moroney and Mason, "The Dynamic Impacts," p. 803.
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to equate the quantity demanded and supplied.

Since

is the

coefficient on di™ in the equation for dM^ (equation (3.10'))
Anf j
g3 V 1 ■
g. represents the change in the quantity of money

A2
resulting from the equilibrium of the quantity of money demanded
and supplied.

We should note that the change in the quantity of

money due to the equilibration process is in the opposite direc
tion of the policy induced change at the initial level of the
market interest rate.
The analysis of the third term in the partial derivative,
A-t <3
g. —

can be facilitated by substituting the full expression for

1 A2
A^

3

A13
in the term g^ — — .

Since A ^

3

= (l+agjf^* we can rewrite this

term as

(l+ag)!!
or as g,f'
gn ---

“2

2

l+a.2
(— -— ).
2

1+&2
The term (— j— ) represents the

2

change in income resulting from the expansionary fiscal action
financed by bond issuance (hence the inclusion of a£ - the coef
ficient on net wealth in the consumption function - in the
numerator).

Since f^ is the coefficient on dYt in the equation

for di™ (equation (3.9")) and since g^ is the
q

coefficient on di™
f H*an

in the equation for dM£, the expression g-,fo (--- —)is the change
c
c A2
in the money supply induced by private sector response to higher
interest rates brought about by the increase in income generated
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by the expansionary fiscal policy action.

We should note that this

change in the quantity of money is in the same direction as the
policy induced change at the initial level of market interest rates.
The three effects of dG

£

> 0 on dMj? can be illustrated in
t

the context of the monetary sector of the macromodel.

Let the

money demand and supply curves be represented in the following
manner
•m

Figure I
Money Supply Effects of Increased Government
Expenditures With Accommodative Federal Reserve Response

If g 3 (-V1) is > 0, then dGt > 0 induces a rightward shift of M^ to
S

as the Federal Reserve responds to the fiscal policy action.

The policy induced change in money is thus

- M^.

Immediate
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restoration of equilibrium requires a reduction in i™ to i™;
this reduction would induce private sector response that would
reduce the expansion in the level of money from

to M^.

This

is the effect represented by the second term of the partial
derivative.

However, as income begins to rise because of dG > 0

and the initial fall in i^, the money demand curve will shift to
M®.

The interest rate will begin to rise and private sector

response will induce an expansion in the money supply beyond
to M^'.

If the money demand curve shifts out to

then pri

vate sector response will induce an expansion in the money supply
beyond

to

m ”' .

Whether the money supply ultimately rises

beyond the policy induced change at the initial interest rate
depends upon the magnitude of the change in income and the income
elasticity of money demand.
Thus when ggC-V^) > 0, the ultimate response of the money
supply to dGfc > 0 is > 0 .

Private sector response may or may not

expand the money supply beyond the policy induced change at the
initial interest rate.
When g 3 (-V1) < 0, that is, when the Federal Reserve con
tracts the money supply in response to a fiscal action of dGt >

0

,

perhaps because of an overriding concern for possible inflationary
consequences of this policy, the ultimate change in the money
>

supply could be - 0.

While the policy response is unambiguous,

the private sector response may result in a rise in the money supply.
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The Initial private sector response before income changes
A f'
0 1
“ a— ® 1 ^

> ® since the policy induced reduction in the money

supply drives up the market interest rate thereby inducing action in
the private sector that partly offsets the policy induced contraction
in the nfoney supply.
Let us initially assume that the expansionary fiscal action
has a stronger effect upon aggregate demand than does the contrac
tion in the money supply so that income rises.

When income begins

to rise, the demand for money rises, and the market interest rate
begins to rise.

This rise results in further private sector

response that mitigates or even offsets the initial

reduction in

the money supply.
These effects can again be illustrated graphically (see Figure

g
II).

The policy induced response shifts the money supply curve to

thereby reducing the money supply by M q -

at i™.

However, the

adjustment to equilibrium drives i|!j to i™ and induces private sector
response that partly offsets the initial fall.

With unchanged

income, the reduction in the money supply is M q - M^.
rises, the money demand curve shifts out, say to M^.
rate rises, and the money supply expands to M^.

As income
The interest

Thus the initial

reduction is further blunted by the shift in money demand.

Note

also that if the shift in money demand is sufficiently large,
say to M^, then the final level of the money supply (Mj” ) is
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Figure II
Money Supply Effects of Increased Government Expenditures
With Non-Accommodative Federal Reserve Response

greater than the initial level, even though the policy reaction
initially lowers the money supply.
We must also consider the possibility that the negative
response of the Federal Reserve is so large that income falls.

In

this instance, private sector response may drive the money supply
below the policy induced reduction.

However, for this possibility

to occur, C-V^) not only must be negative but must also be large in
absolute size.

A response of the size necessary to reduce income

in the face of expansionary fiscal policy might be found if the
economy were in an hyperinflationary period and the Federal Reserve
heavily weighted a deviation of the actual inflation rate from the
desired rate.
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The sign of 3dM^/3Yt_^dr^ ^ will now be evaluated.

This

partial derivative is given by

®3V 2 - *1

V 2

- ®1-^-

Again, as a starting point, the sign of V 2 » the coefficient on
Y fc_^dr^ t (the exogenous change in tax receipts) in the policy
reaction function, will be evaluated.

V£ can be written as:

A11A4S1"w 4A21A14

As noted earlier in this chapter, S 2

> 0.

For V 2

to be < 0 (thereby

implying that the Federal Reserve reduces any change in the level
of its policy instrument in response to an increase in exogenous tax
receipts), the term [ A ^ A ^ S ^ - w ^ A ^ A ^ ] must also be < 0.

This

inequality will be met if

w4

A 1 1

> ^ ^ - ) S r
2 1
A14

a 4

Thus if w. > (—— -r—— )S. (as was necessary for the level of
*
2 1
14
the policy tool to expand when dGt > 0), V 2 would be < 0 and
Y^. ,dr,
>
t- 1
l,t
tool.

0

If Y

would lead to a reduction in the level of the policy
dr,

bonds are retired.
interest rate.

> 0, any deficit is reduced and government
The retirement of the bonds reduces the market

The Federal Reserve would then reduce the level of
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its policy variable to offset this presumably undesirable fluc
tuation in market interest rates.

Thus when financial market

stability is more heavily weighted than are other policy goals,
the Federal Reserve changes its policy variable to offset the finan
cial market effects of Y t_^dr^ t > 0.
to which w^ must exceed
(A1

1

/A2

1

) and (A^/A^).

Note again that the extent

depends upon the values of the ratios
If the ratios are > 1 then w^ must be

greater in absolute terms than if the ratios are <

< 0, then g ^ 2

If V 2

a^so <

1

.

That is, if V 2

< 0, an

increase in exogenous tax receipts leads to a reduction in the
money supply at the initial level of the market interest rate as
a result of the Federal Reserve reaction to the fall in a deficit
(or a rise in a surplus) brought about by the rise in exogenous
tax receipts.
The second term in the partial derivative can be rewritten
as

§3

^ 2

A f'
^ ^ Si•

Following the logic of the analysis of the

a2

O

—

similar term in 3dMt/3dGt , this term represents the change in the
money supply resulting from the equilibration of the quantity of money
demanded and supplied after the policy induced change in the money
supply.

In the case of V 2

process is >

0

< 0, this change due to the equilibration

.

The third term in the partial derivative can be rewritten as
aj+ao
g-f'C— t— ) since A n/ = (a_+a0 )f’.

2

ai'bao
The term (— ?— ) represents the

2

change in income resulting from the exogenous increase in tax
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receipts; the entire expression is the change in the money supply
induced by private sector response to a change in the interest
rate brought about by the change in income generated by contrac
tionary fiscal policy action.

Again, we should note that this

change in the quantity of money is in the same direction as the
policy induced change at the initial level of the market interest
rate.
Graphically, the events described in the preceding para
graph can be represented in the following way

Figure III
Money Supply Effects of Increased Tax Receipts
With Accommodative Federal Reserve Response

Ill

The policy response of the Federal Reserve results in the leftward
shift of M q to

the money supply falls by M q -

level of the interest rate.

at the initial

However, as the interest rate begins to

rise, private sector response leads to an increase in the money
supply to M|.

As income begins to fall, money demand shifts down

to M^, and private sector actions result in a fall in the money
supply to M ” .

The final level of the money supply can thus be less

than or greater than the initial policy induced decline (the decline
will be greater (to M^') if, for example, money demand falls to M ^ ) .
If the
increasing its

Federal Reserve responds to
policy variable (V£ >

0

^ rl t > ^

), then g3 V 2

>0 ; that is,

the money supply rises as a result of the Federal Reserve policy
action.

Furthermore, when V 2

> 0, the response of the private

sector in restoring equilibrium in the money market at an initially
unchanged level of income reduces the money supply below the initial
policy

A^f,'
induced expansion ( [ - ^ V g ■ ^ x g^] < 0).

t >

0

,

If, as a result

of

income begins to fall, money demand begins to fall

and private sector response further reduces the money supply,
possibly below the initial level before the change in tax receipts
a-i+ao
([-g.f^ — — —)] < 0).

However, one must also consider the possi-

A2
bility that the policy induced expansion in the money supply cancels
or outweighs any contractionary effects of

> 0.

If the

monetary expansion cancels the contractionary effect of the tax
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increase, then the ultimate monetary response to Y t_^dr^ t >

0

is an increase beyond the initial level but less than the policy
induced increase.

If the monetary expansion outweighs the contrac

tionary tax effects then income will rise, money demand will rise,
and the money supply may expand beyond the initial policy induced
increase.
The analysis thus far has examined the cases where V-^ < 0
and V 2

I 0.

If either or both

and V 2

equaled 0 (implying that

the Federal Reserve doesn't respond to dGfc and/or Y t_^dr^

then

S
the appropriate partial derivatives of dMt with respect to dGt
or Y

-.dr, . would be the same as in the case of exogenous monetary

C"*!

X jt

policy.
The results of the analysis are summarized in the following
Table I, p.

V.

113.

Conclusion
Thus we see that in the case of exogenous monetary policy*

given the traditionally expected signs of the structural coeffi
cients in the equations of the macromodel, dGfc > 0 unambiguously
leads to an expansion in the money supply and Y t_^dr^ t >
unambiguously leads to a contraction in the money supply.

0

However,

when monetary policy is endogenous, dG > 0 may lead to either an
expansion or contraction in the money supply and Y fc ^dr^ ^ > 0 may
also lead to either an expansion or contraction in the money supply.

/

Table I
Fiscal Policy Effects Upon Changes in the Money Supply
Exogenous
Monetary Policy
9dM^

Endogenous Monetary Policy

A-io

9dGt

* 1

a"

(>0)*

.

-g 3 V 1 +g 1

^ 2 1

V 1 +g 1

and

^ 1 3

(a) ( - V ^ X )

(>0)

(b) ( - V ^ O
(1 ) income rises

(<0 )

(2 ) income falls

(<0 )

(c) (-V-

^

0

(>0 )

9dM^
9Y

t-

,dr
1

l,t

-g.
1 A2

«

0

)

S3V 2"gl t
2
“ 2

1

V 2 " 81 t
1
^ 2

4

and

(a) V 2>
(b) V 2

0

< 0

(1 ) income rises

(<0 )

(2 ) income falls

(<0 )

(c) V 2=0

(<0)
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*( ) indicates direction of change in the money supply

(<0)
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The ambiguity in the case of endogenous monetary policy stems
from the fact that the direction of change in the policy instru
ment depends upon the relative weights in the policymaker's loss
function, the magnitude of the change in the policy instrument
depends upon the relative weights and relevant structural para
meters of the macromodel, and the ultimate change in the money
supply depends upon the reactions of the Federal Reserve and the
private sector (this reaction depends upon the structural para
meters of the model) to the fiscal policy change.
The question of the effect of fiscal policy upon changes in
the money supply cannot be finally answered by analysis of a theo
retical macromodel that treats monetary policy as endogenous.
Although manipulation of the macromodel allows one to examine
the conditions under which the direction of change can be deter
mined, the actual response of the monetary authorities to federal
deficits can only be determined by empirical estimation of the
macromodel and the monetary policy reaction function.

The

analysis in the next chapter will be directed to empirical esti
mation of the macromodel and the policy reaction function.

CHAPTER V

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FISCAL POLICY MONEY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP

I.

Introduction
The previous chapter examined the effects of fiscal policy

upon the money supply when Federal Reserve policymakers are pre
sumed to systematically and predictably react to current and
previous period movements in economic variables.

It was shown that

changes in government expenditures and taxes have an ambiguous impact
upon the money supply.

The direction of change of the money supply

depends upon the reactions of Federal Reserve policymakers and the
private sector of the economy to the change in fiscal policy, and
these reactions in turn depend upon the relative weights in the
Federal Reserve loss function and the structural parameters of the
macromodel.

Thus to determine the actual response of the Federal

Reserve and the money supply to fiscal policy, the structural para
meters of the macromodel and the coefficients in the Federal Reserve
reaction function must be empirically estimated.
Presentation and analysis of these empirical estimates occupy
the remainder of this chapter.

Estimates of the structural parameters

of the macromodel when the Federal Reserve is exogenous and when the
Federal Reserve is endogenous are presented and analyzed in section II
of this chapter.

Estimates of the coefficients in the reaction func

tion and the implicit relative weights in the loss function are
115
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examined in section III.

Reduced form money supply equations for

both the macromodel with the Federal Reserve exogeneous and the
model with the Federal Reserve endogenous are presented and analyzed
in section IV.

II.

Parameter Estimates for the Macromodels
Since an interdependent system of equations is to be estimated,

a systems method is employed.

Ordinary least squares estimation of

the equations of a simultaneous system leads to inconsistent estimates
of the structural parameters, but the problem of inconsistent esti
mates is overcome through the use of a systems method of estimation.
An iterative three-stage least squares estimation technique is employed
in this study since this technique produces consistent and asymp
totically efficient estimates of the structural parameters.

This

technique utilizes information about the correlation between structural
disturbances in the estimation of the equations of the system, infor
mation that is not utilized in the two-stage least squares estimation
technique.^"
The estimates of the structural parameters of the macromodels
with the Federal Reserve exogenous and with the Federal Reserve endoge
nous are presented in Tables I and II, respectively.
the variables are provided in Table III.
models are discussed below.

Definitions of

The equations of these

These models were estimated from

^For a technical description of the three-stage least squares
technique and other systems methods of estimation, see, for example,
Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics, (New York: The Macmillan Com
pany, 1971), pp. 531-99.

Table I

Model 1: Federal Reserve Exogenous*
Product Sector
(Equlllbrluo Condition)

(1) Yt * ct + Ic+ ct + rtL+ Et “ 1Mt
(2) Ct - -10.54+.257 YDC+ .018 W
Efc + .728 C
(-3.43) (4.25)
(3.03)
(10.48)
(3) YDt - Yt - KCAt - T ScL - TE,EN - TE,EX

R2 ■ .998

(4) W
Et - 620.38- 34.94 l“ - 53.74 1*+ .572 Y

R2 ” .923

(Wealth Function)

( 33.72) (-9.23)
(-5.22) (18.13)
(5) It - 9.82 - 3.31 1^_2 + .166dYt l + .053 Y + .685 I x

R2 » .986

(Investment Function)

(3.28) (-2.25)
(1.97)
(5.85)
(6) IMt - -2.77 + .008 Yc + .964 IM x

-2
R = .991

(Import Function)

(Consumption Function)
(Disposable Income Deflnldon)

(13.69)

(-2.05) (2.12) (26.74)
Monetary Sector
(7) «“ -

(Equilibrium Condition)

(8) i“ - 8.67 - .099
(3.99) (-3.44)

+ .015 Y .596 PE
+

(3.84)

_2

R « .683

(Inverse Money Demand Function)

(6.81)

M
H-*

Table I (Continued)

(9) H5 - 32.53 + 3.88 1l” - lj?S] + 7.46 I'BR
R2 =.991
(Honey SupplyFunction)
t
c c
c
•(20.54) (3.35)
(103.25)
(10) 1*=* .351 + .069 l" + .0006 Y
+ .780
R2 =.985
(Term Structure Function)
(3.88) (3.64) (3.66)
(16.33)
Price Sector
(11) P = .401 - .113 RADt + .923 P^ - .016 CP - .546 W
PC+ 2.82 WPCAF R2 = .706 (Inflation Function)
(1.31) (-4.51)
(10.88)
(-.41)
(-.97)
(4.86)
*t-statlstlcs are In parentheses below each coefficient. R^ = R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.

TABLE II
Model tl: Federal Reserve Endogenous*
Product SecCor
(1) Yt = Ct * It + *•
Kt - tHt

(Equilibrium Cundlclon)

*■

(2) Ct » -10.88 + .304 YDt + .02 W
EC+ .673 C j
(-3.58) (5.20)
(3.40) (9.99)
(3) YDt - Yt - KCAt - T^L- TE,EN - t£,EX

R2- ..999

(4) W
Et =■617.61 - 35.29 l" - 51.581* + .565 Yt
(34.53) (-9.49)
(-5.20)
(18.44)
(5) lt - 9.13 - 2.88 1^_2 + .197 <!Yt_l + .049 Y( + .697 1
(3.07) (-1.98) (2.41)
(5.48)
(14.06)
(6) .IMt = -2.89 + .008 Y£ + .960 IHt t
(-2.14) (2.22) (26.70)
Monetary Sector
(7)
=M
S
C t
18) 1™= 8.08 - .091 + .014 Y + .582 PE
(3.82) (-3.25) (1.67)
(6.71)
(9) M
E = 32.4 + 3.80 l!™-i°S| + 7.47 URR
(20.44) (3.31)
(103.25)

R2= . 923

(Wealth Function)

R2 =..986

(Investment Function)

R2 =.,991

(Import Function)

R2 « . 683

(Equilibrium Condition)
(Inverse Monev Demand Findon)

R2 =. 991

(Money Supply Function)

(Consumption Function)
(Disposable Income Definition)

Table IT (Continued)

(10)

UBRt - 6.57 + .022

- .034 t £ ,EX + .017

j + .003 RYH^

r2

» .998

(Federal Reserve Reacctai
Function)

(6.55) (2.98)
(-2.98)
(19.26)
(2.27)
+ .051 + .172 IIDEHO+ .123IIREP2 - .573 i"_j + .048 CP
(.894)
(2.47)
(2.04)
(-11.41)
(.435)
+ .342 UPC+ .583 W
PCAF
(2.08)
(3.56)
(11) I* = .38 + .074 1™+ .0006 Yt + .762
R2 = .985 (Terra Structure Function)
(4.25) (4.00)
(4.04)
(16.28)
Price Sector
(12) Pt - .52 - .075 RADt + .897 - .135 CP - .505 W
PC+ 2.74 WPCAF R2 » .727 (Inflation Function)
(1.79) (-3.56)
(11.05) (-.36)
(-.93)
(4.93)

*t-statlstlcs are in parentheses beloweach coefficient. R * R4"adjusted for decrees of freedom.
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TABLE III
Definition of Variables

Y

= nominal GNP, period t.
= nominal consumption expenditures, period t.

Ct ^
It

B nominal consumption expenditures, period t- 1 .
= nominal investment expenditures, period t.
= nominal investment expenditures, period t- 1 ,

F
Gt

G

SL

= nominal federal government expenditures on goods and services
period t.
= nominal state and local government expenditures on goods
services, period t.

and

= nominal exports, period t.
IMt

= nominal imports, period t.

IMt_^ = nominal imports, period t-1 .
YDt

= nominal disposable income, period t.

WEt

= nominal net wealth, period t.

KCAt

= nominal value of capital consumption allowance, period t.

SL
Tfc

= nominal state and

local net tax receipts, period t.

F EN
T *
“ nominal endogenous federal net tax receipts, period t.
F EX
T *
= nominal exogenous federal net tax receipts, period t.
i™

= short-term interest rate (3-month Treasury bill rate),period t.

i”| .
C_X

= short-term interest rate (3-month Treasury bill rate), period
t- 1 .

I
ifc

«= long-term interest rate (long-term federal government bond
rate), period t.
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£,
it_l “ long-term Interest rate (long-term federal government bond
rate), period t-1 .
£
i

2

“ long-term interest rate (long-term federal government bond
rate), period t-2 .

dYt_^ = change in nominal income from period t- 2

to t- 1 .

= nominal money demand, period t.
M

S

= nominal money supply, period t.

.£
P

= anticipated rate of inflation, period t.

*~DS
it

= Federal Reserve discount rate, period t.

UBRt = nominal unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve requirement
changes, period t.
RYHt = real high-employment output, period t.
•D
P

= Federal Reserve desired rate of inflation, period t.
•

IIDEMO = interaction dummy variable for P
administration.

d

and Kennedy-Johnson

IIRZP2 = interaction dummy variable for pj? and Nixon-Ford
administration.
WPC

= wage and price freeze dummy variable.

WPCAF = post-freeze wage and price control dummy variable,
GP

= guidepost dummy variable.

P

= actual rate of inflation, period t.

RAD j. = aggregate demand proxy, period t.
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seasonally adjusted, quarterly data beginning in the first quarter of
1953 (1953:01) and ending in the last quarter of 1976 (1976:04).^
This period was selected since it spans three political regimes of
eight consecutive years each.

Eisenhower was President from 1953:01-

1960:04, Kennedy and Johnson from 1961:01-1968:04, and Nixon and Ford
from 1969:01-1976:04.

The sample period was chosen to facilitate the

testing of the hypothesis that Federal Reserve policies reflect, in
part, changes in political attitudes toward economic policy generated
by changes in presidential administrations.

The influence of the

administration on Federal Reserve behavior could result from public
discussion of Federal Reserve policies by fiscal policymakers or
from joint discussion of policy problems by Federal Reserve and fiscal
policymakers.

The testing of this hypothesis is discussed in section

III of this chapter.
first-difference form.

The model is estimated in level rather than
Data sources are described in the appendix.

It should be noted that the consumption, import, and termstructure equations differ slightly from the specifications made in
Chapter III.

The difference in each case is the inclusion of the

dependent variable lagged one period as an explanatory variable.

The

inclusion of such a term is consistent with an implicit Koyck lag
structure.

2

Since economic theory has little to say about the

The estimation package used is the LS123 program written by
J. Tu of the Brookings Institution.
The Durbin-Watson statistics are not presented in Tables I and
II since they are unreliable indicators of autocorrelation in the
presence of lagged dependent variables.
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appropriate time lags to be Imposed In an equation, considerable
experimentation with alternative lag schemes led to the adoption of
the implicit Koyck lag structure for the consumption, import, termstructure, and investment equations.

The Investment equation was

specified in Chapter III with an implicit Koyck lag structure due
3

to the gradual adjustment of actual to desired investments.

Similar

lag structures for the wealth, short-term interest rate, money supply,
inflation, and reaction function equations were tested but did not
improve the fit of these equations.

Hence, these equations have no

lagged terms as explanatory variables.
The individual equations of the models will now be discussed.
Since t-tests revealed that only the coefficient on RADfc differed
significantly (at the 5 percent level) between Models I and II, and
since Model II contains the reaction function for the monetary
authority, the discussion of the individual equations will be limited
to Model II.
All coefficients in the consumption function are of the
expected sign and are significant at the 5 percent level.
Disposable income is a jointly dependent variable in the
model and is derived by subtracting the aggregate capital consumption
3

It should be noted that the lag patterns experimented with in
the estimation of the system were restricted by the characteristics
of the three-stage least squares estimation package utilized in this
study. The package employed could not accommodate polynomial lag
structures. Thus implicit Koyck lag structures were preferable to
any other lag pattern tested, but a polynominal lag structure may or
may not have been preferable to the implicit Koyck structures utilized
in this study.
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allowance and total net taxes (state, local, and federal) from GNP.
The capital consumption allowance and net taxes for state and local
governments are assumed to be exogenous to the model.

Federal net

taxes are split into an exogenous and an endogenous component.

This

division of net taxes is accomplished in the following manner.
Beginning with a tax function of the form T “ rY where T = net federal
tax receipts, r = average tax rate, and Y = GNP, we can write

T. = T. , + dT. where dTfc = T„ - T _.
t
t— 1
t
t
t
t— 1
Differentiating T = rY we obtain
dT = rdY + Ydr.
Thus, dT

t

s r

.dY„ + Y.
t—±
t
t— 1

t

The term rt_^dYt represents the change in net tax receipts when rfc_^
is unchanged but Y changes.

This term thus represents a component

of the endogenous portion of tax receipts, that is, the change in
receipts due only to changes in the level of economic activity.
The term Y

appears to combine two effects on tax receipts

receipts - the effect of a change in the level of economic activity
on the average tax rate and the effect of a discretionary change in
tax rates on tax receipts.

In a tax system with some progressive

elements, one would expect r to fluctuate with changes in Y; as Y rises
one expects r to rise and vice versa.

However, because of exemptions
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and deductions that become accessable as one's Income rises, a system
that is progressive in name may not in fact be progressive.

Thus the

proposition that r varies with changes in Y is an empirical question,
and this proposition was tested by regressing dr
least squares.

L

on Y

U

using ordinary

rfc was calculated by dividing net federal tax receipts

in period t by Y £ .

The regression of drt on Y

variation of dr with changes in Y.
low and the coefficient on Y

The R

2

revealed no systematic

for the equation was very

was not statistically significant.

Based

upon this result, all changes in r were taken as discretionary so that
the term Y t_^drt represents the exogenous change in tax receipts, that
is, the change in tax receipts due only to a change in tax rates.
Utilizing the equation T t =

+ dTfc and substituting from

the total differential we obtain

Tt ' V i V i + rt-idYt + V i dV
Rearranging we obtain T

Tt a

+ Y t-l^rt*

t

" r. - (Y. , + dYfc) + Y. ..dr or
t—J. t—1
t
t—1 t
tenn

rt-lY t *S uset* to Senerate a time

series for endogenous net tax receipts and the term Y

^ rt is used

to generate a time series for exogenous net tax receipts.

Examina

tion of the time series so generated reveals that the change in exo
genous receipts is generally in the same direction as announced
changes in tax policy.
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However, one problem that emerges In utilizing this tech
nique stems from the effect of a temporary change in tax receipts
in one quarter on the tax rate for subsequent quarters.

Take for

example the case of a temporary rebate that applies only to one
quarter.

Net tax receipts will fall in this quarter and hence the

net tax rate will fall in this quarter.

Net tax receipts will return

to the normal pattern in the next quarter but the change in the
"permanent" tax rate will be exaggerated because of the temporary
decline in tax receipts in the previous quarter.

To reduce the

exaggerated effect on the tax rate caused by temporary tax changes,
the endogenous and exogenous components of tax receipts were calcu
lated in the following manner:

endogenous receipts (TE,E^) = r^

and exogenous receipts (TF »EX) = Y t_-jdr£
+

^ t _ 2

+ rt_ 3 ) M and dr^ = r^ -

where r£ = (rt + rfc_^

This technique thus reduces

the effect of a temporary change in receipts on the calculated rate
in subsequent quarters by smoothing changes in the calculated rate
and thereby reduces many of the puzzling sharp reversals in policy
from the quarter of a temporary change to the next several quarters.
The resulting time series are smoother than the initial series.

The

change in exogenous receipts again is generally in the same direction
as announced changes in tax policy.
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The budget constraints for both the monetary and fiscal
authorities are implicitly incorporated into the model through
their effects upon the wealth variable.

Wealth is measured here

as MB + KSTK + VGS where MB = monetary base, KSTK = discounted value
of net dividend payments to the public, and

VGS « discounted value

of interest payments on federal debt, which is treated for simplicity
as consisting solely of consols.

*

a

Explicitly, KSTKt = DIVt/it where

DIVfc = current value of net dividend payments to private sector and
£
i„ = current value of the long term interest rate.
t

VGS,. = INTG„/WDR,.
t
t
t

where INTGt = current total interest payments on federal government
debt held by private sector and WDR^ = a weighted discount rate.

The

weighted discount rate is the weighted sum of the current period short
and long term interest rates where the weight on the long term rate
is the proportion of long term debt in the total federal debt and the
%

weight on the short term rate is one minus the weight on the long term
rate.
The weighting scheme thus results in all intermediate term
debt being treated as short term debt.
scheme would be to treat intermediate

An

alternative weighting

term debt

as long term debt

and weight the short term rate by the proportion of short term debt
in the total debt and weight the long

term debt

by one minus the

weight on the short term rate.

over some

time periods the

Since

interest rate on intermediate term debt moves similarly to the short
term rate (thus giving support to the first weighting scheme) and
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over other time periods moves similarly to the long term interest
rate (thus giving support to the second weighting scheme), the first
weighting scheme was used since the wealth variable including VGS
generated with this scheme resulted in a better fit of the consump
tion function.
Another alternative method of generating a weighted discount
rate would be to treat the intermediate term interest rate as endoge
nous and weight the short term, intermediate term and long term
rates by their respective share in total debt.

This method was

rejected to avoid unduly complicating the model by introducing another
stochastic equation.
It should be noted that treating all federal debt as consols
rather than explicitly incorporating information about the term to
maturity of the debt (which was not done because of the complexity
of collecting this information and discounting over the term to
maturity of each issue) results in a measure of the value of these
securities greater than their actual market value.

However, the

value of government securities generated by the scheme outlined
above should move in a similar fashion to the market value of
government securities.

Thus it is assumed that the measure of VGS

outlined above is an acceptable proxy for the current market value
of these securities.
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Since the measure of the market value of government securi
ties likely overstates their actual market value, the measure of
wealth employed here likely overstates the "true" net wealth of the
private sector.

However, since a change in an economic variable that

affects the "true" net wealth should also affect the measure employed
here in a similar manner, it is assumed that the measure used in
this study is an acceptable proxy for the "true" measure of private
sector net wealth.

For example, a rise in market interest rates,

ceteris paribus, will reduce VGS and KSTK in our model and should
have the same effect upon the "true" wealth measure.
Wealth is treated in the model as an endogenous variable and
in
£
is regressed on Y t , it> and i^.
proxy for DIV. and INTG„.
t
t

It is assumed that Y

is a reasonable

An increase in DIV„ and INTG,., ceteris
t
t

paribus, leads to an increase in the wealth measure used here.

An

increase in MBt , even though the value of government securities held
by the public falls by the same amount, leads to an increase in wealth
by reducing market interest rates and thereby increasing the dis
counted value of DIVt and INTGfc.
on Y

Thus, as expected, the coefficient

in equation 4, Table II, is positive and statistically sig

nificant.

Also as expected, since an increase in market interest

rates, ceteris paribus, lowers the discounted value of DIVfc and INTG^
ID

£

the coefficients on it and it in the wealth equation are negative
and are statistically significant.
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Thus, even though the budget constraints of the monetary and
fiscal authorities do not explicitly appear in the wealth equation,
their effects appear implicitly through their impact upon the explana
tory variables.

To understand this, assume for simplicity an

initially balanced budget.

As was seen in Chapter II, an increase

in government expenditures with constant tax receipts has two
effects - the deficit, through the post-Accord budget constraint,
requires issuance of more government'securities which, ceteris pari
bus, tends to increase wealth, but the financing of the deficit tends
to raise market interest rates which, ceteris paribus, tends to
reduce wealth.
Both effects are captured in the model.

The increased

government expenditures tend to raise aggregate demand and output
directly and to induce increases in consumption and investment
expenditure within the same quarter.

Any crowding-out effects on

investment of financing the deficit are delayed two quarters.
Imports also rise within the same quarter, but given the size of
the relevant structural coefficients (on YDt in the consumption
function, on Y

in the investment function, and on Y fc in the import

function) this rise is unlikely to offset the stimulative effects
upon C. and I..
t
t

Thus the increase in Y. as a result of the deficit
t

tends to increase WEt (and thereby further increase Ct) .
same time, the increase in Y

At the

resulting from the deficit tends to

raise both the short and long term interest rates and thereby reduce
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W E t (see equations 4,

8

, and 11, Table II).

Evidence on whether the

depressing effect on wealth offsets the stimulatory effect on wealth
within the same quarter can be obtained by examining the reduced
form equation for wealth.

The reduced form equations for W E t for

both Models I and II suggest that these same quarter effects are
expansionary.

4

All coefficients in the investment, import, and inverse money
demand equations have the anticipated signs and are significant at
the 5 percent level.
A price expectations variable is included in both the inverse
money demand function (equation

8

) and the inflation equation (equa• jg

tion 12).

The price expectations variable, P , is calculated from an

autoregression of the current inflation rate on past rates of infla
tion.

Economic units are seen in this approach as basing their

expectation of the current rate of inflation solely upon past rates
of inflation.

Both straight lag structures (regressing P

on

n
i |

0

with various values for n) and polynomial lag structures

were estimated.

The best fit was found for the following straight lag

structure

•p

p?

•p

•

•p

- pt-i - E(pt-i - pt-i>-

For Model I, the coefficients on G and T *
in the reduced
form for WEt are .186 and -.048, respectively.
For Model II, the
coefficients on
and t £ » ^ in the reduced form for WE are .623 and
-.731, respectively.
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Lag structures of longer length - both straight and polynominal were characterized by sign reversals on lags beyond t-3.

The equation

employed thus implies that economic units form their expectations of
inflation based upon the very recent past - the inflation rates for
the past three quarters.

The autoregressive equation selected is

used to generate a time series of expected inflation rates which is
then employed as an explanatory variable in the short-term interest
rate and inflation rate equations.
An alternative technique of generating expected inflation
rates was also tested.

The technique tested was suggested by

Toyoda and is based upon an adaptive expectations model.^

The

specific model employed is

P^* et
*t-l

= E(P
Mit

- 1

- P^
)
*t-l'*

This model states that the change in the expected rate of inflation
is a function of the discrepancy between the actual and expected
inflation rates in the previous period.

E is an adjustment coeffi

cient which shows the rate of adjustment to this discrepancy.
Rearranging this equation we find

^T. Toyoda, "Price Expectations and the Short-Run and LongRun Phillips Curves in Japan 1956-1968," Review of Economics and
Statistics, 54, 3 (August 1972), pp. 267-74.

•£

Time series for P

can now be constructed by employing the actual

inflation series, assuming a particular value for E, assuming a
starting value for

*E

an^ then recursively solving the equation.

Ten series were generated by using values of E from .1 to 1 in incre
ments of

. 1

and by assuming an initial expected inflation rate of

0

.

These ten time series were employed in the short-term interest rate
•Jj*

and inflation rate equations as measures of P .

Estimation of the

*E
entire system of equations for each time series measure of P
resulted in equations that had a poorer fit and that often had the
opposite sign of the estimated parameters presented in Table I and
II.

Because of the poorer fit and sign reversals, these measures of

expected inflation were rejected in favor of the series generated by
the autoregressive equation.
All coefficients in the money supply equation are of the anti
cipated sign and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The estimated equation differs slightly from the equation described in
Chapter II.

in
-DS
Rather than including ifc and it as separate explanatory

”DS
variables, the difference between i™, and ifc was employed as a
separate explanatory variable.

in
-DS
When it and it were employed as

—DS
separate explanatory variables, the coefficient on it was positive,
the opposite of the anticipated sign.

Combining i™ and i ^

into a

single measure does not alter the theoretical rationale for including
both variables in the money supply equation and since the regression
results were more acceptable than when the variables were employed
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separately, the single measure regression Is preferred.

It should

also be noted that UBRt is unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve
requirement changes.

Thus all of the Federal Reserve's major policy

tools are reflected directly or indirectly in this equation.
All coefficients in the term-structure equation are of the
anticipated sign and are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
The inflation equation differs slightly in form from the
equation specified in Chapter II.

The equation in Chapter II included

both the inverse of the total unemployment rate and an aggregate demand
variable as separate explanatory variables.

Considerable experimenta

tion with the various forms of this equation led to the elimination of
the unemployment rate variable from this equation.

The unemployment

rate variable, whether employed alone or with the aggregate demand
variable or whether only the current period value or the current
period value and lagged values were employed, consistently had the
opposite of the anticipated sign.

For this reason the unemployment

rate variable was dropped from the equation and only the aggregate
demand variable was retained.
The aggregate demand variable employed (RAD^) is similar to
a variable employed by Gordon in a study of inflation in the 1970's.^

^R. J. Gordon, "Can the Inflation of the 1970s Be Explained,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1977), p. 269.
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The variable is defined in the following manner:

7

where YH^ = nominal high employment GNP in the current period.

The

term (YHt - Y t)/YHt measures the gap between potential and actual GNP
as a proportion of potential GNP.

The numerator of RADt measures the

change in the proportional GNP gap from the previous to the current
quarter.

Thus RADt represents the proportional rate of change in the

proportional GNP gap.

One would expect an increase in RADt to reduce

•

P

since the pressure of aggregate demand on capacity is reduced.

Therefore the anticipated sign of the coefficient on RADfc is negative.
Other aggregate demand variables were employed both singly and in
conjunction with RAD^..

However, the best fitting equation in terms

of the match between estimated and anticipated coefficient signs and
in terms of statistically significant coefficients on the aggregate
demand variable(s) was the equation containing only RADt as the

g
aggregate demand variable.

Nominal high employment GNP (YH ) is constructed by multi
plying real high employment GNP in period t by the actual GNP price
deflator in period t.

8

^t^t

Other aggregate demand variables tested included (—
£
•), and (yjj- ) •

— ),

These measures were used as the sole aggre

gate demand variable and the first two were used as companions to RADt<
Equations with various lag structures on these variables were also
estimated but rejected.
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The estimated Inflation equation also differs from the equation
specified In Chapter II by the Inclusion of the guldepost (GP)
the wage and price control (WPC and WPCAF) dummy variables.

and

One

should take into account governmental programs that might temporarily
•

«r

affect the fundamental relationships between Pfc, RAD^., and P£ .

By

altering the wage and pricing options available to the private sector,
the guideposts and wage and price controls should affect the infla
tion process and therefore should be controlled for in an empirical
study of the inflation process.

The effects of the guideposts and

wage and price controls are introduced through the use of dummy
variables.

The guidepost dummy variable has the value of 1 for the

period 1963:1 to 1966:2 and 0 for all other periods.
controls are represented by two dummy variables.

Wage and price

The first dummy

variable, WPC, covers the period of price freeze and thus has a value
of 1 from 1971:3 to 1972:4 and 0 for all other periods.

Following

Gordon, the second dummy, WPCAF, covers the period 1973:1 to 1975:1,
a period which covers the non-freeze portion of the controls and
, 9
return to no controls.
The anticipated signs on GP, WPC, and WPCAF will now be
discussed.

To the extent that firms and workers complied with the

voluntary guideposts, one expects the inflation rate in the guidepost period to be less than without guideposts.

To the extent that

9
R. J. Gordon, "World Inflation and Monetary Accommodation in
Eight Countries," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1977),
p. 450.
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the voluntary guideposts were ignored, one expects no effect upon the
inflation rate.
or zero.

The coefficient on GP is thus expected to be negative

One would expect that a mandatory freeze on wage and price

increases would reduce the inflation rate.
on WPC is negative.

Thus the expected sign

However, when a freeze is lifted and programs

like Phases II and III of Nixon's New Economic Policy which relied
heavily upon voluntary compliance are implemented, one would expect
a surge in the inflation rate as firms and workers attempt to secure
previously prevented price and wage increases.

The anticipated sign

on WPCAF is thus positive.
All coefficients in the inflation rate equation are of the
anticipated sign.

However, the coefficients on GP and WPC are not

statistically significant but the coefficients on all other variables
are significant at the 5 percent level.

Even though the t-tests on

the GP and WPC variables lead to a rejection of the hypothesis that
these coefficients differ from zero, they are retained in the infla
tion equation.

Even though the programs proxied by GP and WPC may

have had a negligible effect upon the rate of inflation, they may have
had a significant effect upon Federal Reserve policy.

This proposition

will be discussed when the reaction function is analyzed in the next
section.

The coefficient on WPCAF indicates a very strong rebound

effect from the wage and price freeze.
significantly different from zero.
hypothesis that P

=

1

*E
The coefficient on P is

Furthermore, a t-test of the

leads to the non-rejection of the hypothesis,
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a finding that provides some support for the accelerationist approach
to the inflation process.
The discussion thus far has focused upon the structural equa
tions of Model II with the exception of the reaction function
(equation 10).

It was seen that all coefficients are of the antici-

-2
pated sign and that the R s indicate a reasonably good fit of the
data.

The reaction function will now be discussed in the following

section.

III.

The Federal Reserve Reaction Function
An essential element in the analysis of the relationship

between fiscal policy and the money supply is the Federal Reserve
reaction function.

It is recalled that the reaction function relates

the Federal Reserve policy tool to the lagged endogenous and exogenous
variables in the system of equations and to the desired values of the
arguments in the Federal Reserve's loss function.

The coefficients

on the explanatory variables in the reaction function are complex
mixtures of the structural parameters of the model and the weights in
the loss function.
A reaction function derived from the loss function and Model I
would contain 18 lagged endogenous and exogenous variables and 4

^ F o r a discussion of statistical tests of the accelerationist
hypothesis, see for example, R. J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in
the Theory of Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Monetary Eco
nomies , 2, 2 (April 1976), pp. 191-96 and A. M. Santomero and J. J.
Seater, "The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-Off: A Critique of the
Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, 16, 2 (June 1978),
pp. 525-7.

140

variables for the desired values of the arguments In the loss function.
It was felt that Including all 23 variables in the estimation of the
reaction function would undesirably reduce the degrees of freedom for
the estimation and would also result in a needlessly complex reaction
function.

Hence,

was employed as a proxy for all lagged endoge-

F
F EX
11
nous and exogenous variables except Gt , T * , GP, WPC, and WPCAF.
F
F EX
Gt and T *
were retained as individual arguments since the ultimate
concern of this study is the effect of fiscal policy upon the money
supply.

GP, WPC, and WPCAF were retained in order to ascertain if

these programs had significant effects upon Federal Reserve behavior
and hence the money supply.
The reaction function was thus estimated by regressing the
Federal Reserve policy instrument - unborrowed reserves adjusted for
F
F EX
reserve requirement changes - on G , T ’ , Y
desired values for (Y /P ), P , and i .
U

L>

GP, WPC, WPCAF and

Real high-employment GNP

(RYHt) was used as a measure of desired real income, the average
inflation rate over the previous four quarters was used as a measure
•D
of the desired inflation rate (Pt) , and the level of the short-term
interest rate in the previous quarter

was used as a measure

^ S i n c e Et is an exogenous variable it should be in the
reaction function. However, it cannot be assumed that Y t_^ is a proxy
for Et . The reaction function was estimated with E as a separate
explanatory variable. However, the t-statistic indicated the coef
ficient was not significantly different from zero, and a general
linear test of the significance of this coefficient led to nonrejec
tion of the null hypothesis that the coefficient was equal to zero.
As a result of this test, E t was omitted from the reaction function.
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of the desired level of i™.

It was assumed that the desired balance

of trade was neither surplus nor deficit, so that no term for the
desired balance of trade appears in the estimated reaction function.
In addition to these variables two dummy variables designed to cap
ture any effects of the particular political administration upon
Federal Reserve behavior (IIDEMO and IIREP2) appear in the estimated
reaction function.

The estimated reaction function will now be

analyzed.
The coefficient on Federal government expenditures (.022) is
positive and the coefficient on exogenous federal tax receipts (-.034)
is negative.
level.

Both are statistically significant at the 5 percent

Thus one sees that expansionary fiscal policy as measured

by an increase in federal expenditures or by a reduction in exogenous
federal taxes leads to an expansion in unborrowed reserves adjusted
for reserve requirement changes within the same quarter.

12

These

signs are expected when the weight on financial market stability
exceeds the weighted sum of the other weights in the Federal Reserve
loss function.

13

Thus within the same quarter the Federal Reserve

accommodates expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy, thereby
reinforcing the effect of fiscal policy variables upon other
endogenous variables within the system.

12

The reaction function was also estimated using the new CEA
estimates of high-employment expenditures and tax receipts; the
coefficient on high-employment expenditures was .026 and the coeffi
cient on high-employment receipts was -.015. Both were statistically
significant.
13

See pp. 100-12 in Chapter IV of this study.
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The coefficient on

is positive (.017) and is statistically

significant at the 5 percent level.

Since

is employed as a proxy

for the aggregate demand effects of the excluded lagged endogenous and
exogenous variables, the anticipated sign on
relative weights in the loss function.

depends upon the

The positive sign on

is

expected when the weight on financial market stability exceeds the
weighted sum of the other weights in the loss function, just as in
the case of government expenditures.

Since the coefficient is posi

tive, the Federal Reserve is seen as accommodating increases in
aggregate demand from the sources proxied by

in order to offset

(at least partially) the effects of an increase in aggregate demand
upon the short-term interest rate.
The coefficient on RYHt is also positive (.003) and is sig
nificant at the 5 percent level, thus indicating an expansion (con
traction) in UBRt as desired real income rises (falls).

The coeffi

cient on RYHt is a combination of the weights in the loss function
and the reduced form coefficients on UBRt in the reduced forms for
real income, the inflation rate, the short-term interest rate, and
the balance of trade derived from Model I.

Specifically, the

coefficient as derived from the theoretical model developed in
Chapter III is

+ W ^ )

where W x = weight

on the gap between the actual and the desired real income in the
loss function,

c weight on the gap between the actual and the

desired inflation rate,

= weight on the gap between the actual
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and the desired short-term interest rate,

= weight on the gap

between the actual and the desired balance of trade, and j..

J-j

i.f

j_

are the reduced form coefficients on UBRt for real income, the
inflation rate, the short-term interest rate, and the balance of trade.
From the theoretical model, one expects j^,

^

> ® an<*

< 0>

these expectations are borne out by the reduced forms for Model I.
2
2
2
Since the W^, i = 1, ..., 4, are positive the sum (W^j^ + ^2^2 + W 3^3

2
+

is > 0 and

> 0.

Thus the expected sign is positive, and

the estimated coefficient is of the expected sign.
To test the proposition that Federal Reserve response to
desired real income differed with different political administra
tions, interaction dummy variables were employed in an estimation of
the reaction function.

The interaction dummy variables used test

whether the coefficient on RYH^ shifted with different administra
tions.

Since the data cover three administrations, two dummy variables

were employed.

One interaction dummy, IYDEM0, consists of zeroes from

1953:01-1960:04 and 1969:01-1976:04 and the actual values of RYH^ in
the period of the Democratic administration, 1961:01-1968:04.

The

other dummy variable, IYREP2, consists of zeroes from 1953:01-1968:04
and the actual values of RYHt from 1969:01-1976:04, the period spanning
the Nixon-Ford administration.

A regression equation containing RYHt ,

IYDEM0, IYREP2, and all other variables except IIDEMO and IIREP2 in
equation 10, Table II as separate explanatory variables was estimated.
The coefficient on RYHt in this equation was significant at the 5
percent level, but the coefficients on IYDEMO and IYREP2 were not
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significant.

In general, in multiple regression studies it is not

valid to drop a variable from an equation merely because the tstatistic for that variable indicates the variable is not statis
tically significant.

To determine whether a variable can be

dropped, a general linear test should be employed.

14

However, tests

of statistical significance for dummy variables using the t-statistics
for these variables are equivalent to general linear tests of their
significance.^"’

Thus since the coefficients on IYDEMO and IYREP2

were not significant, these variables were dropped from the model.
These results suggest that the response of the Federal Reserve to
RYHt did not differ across political administrations.'*"*’
A four-quarter average of actual past Inflation rates was
•D 17
employed as a measure of the desired inflation rate (Pfc) .
"D
*
*
•
*
P. = (P. , + Pfc o +
q + P*. /)/4.
t
t-±
t— e.
t— j
t—4

Thus

The Federal Reserve is thus

seen as adjusting its desired inflation rate in response to the past
• T)

behavior of this variable.

Formulation of P

in this manner implies

14

For a discussion of the general linear test, see J. Neter
and W. Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1974), pp. 214-72.
"*'"’Neter and Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models,
p. 308.
"^A regression equation containing RYH , IYDEMO, IYREP2, and
other variables in equation 10, Table II including IIDEMO and IIREP2
was estimated, but the conclusions reached in the earlier test were
not altered.
17

The inflation rate lagged one period was also employed,
but the basic results were not altered.
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that the Federal Reserve does not want to induce large quarter-toquarter fluctuations in the inflation rate, perhaps because of a
concern that large fluctuations in Pt from quarter-to-quarter
increase uncertainty in the economy and thereby worsen the perfor
mance of the economy.
The coefficient on P^ from the theoretical model is

(W2 j 2 )/(W1jJ + W 2 j 2 + W 3 j 3 + W 4 jJ).

Since j 2

> 0, the expected sign on P*? is positive.

As the desired

inflation rate rises (falls) the Federal Reserve increases
• TV

(decreases) UBRt .

As expected, the coefficient on P fc in the regres*D
However, the coefficient on P fc is not

sion is positive (.051).
significant in equation

1 0

, which also contains interaction dummies

for the desired inflation rate.

In a regression excluding the

interaction dummies the coefficient is both positive and statis
tically significant.
To test the proposition that Federal Reserve response to
the desired inflation rate differed with different political
administrations, the interaction dummies IIDEMO and IIREP2 were
employed in an estimation of the reaction function.

IIDEMO

consists of zeroes from 1953:01-1960:04 and 1969:01-1976:04 and
the actual values of P^ from 1961:01-1968:04.

IIREP2 consists

of zeroes from 1953:01-1968:04 and the actual values of P® from
1969:01-1976:04.

The estimated coefficients on both IIDEMO and
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IIREP2 are positive and statistically significant.

Thus the

*D
coefficient on Pt during the Kennedy-Johnson administration is
.223 and the coefficient during the Nixon-Ford administration is
.174.
The proposition that the Federal Reserve response to
desired inflation varied over different political administrations
is thus not rejected.

The estimated equation indicates a signifi

cantly greater response by the Federal Reserve to the desired
inflation rate during the Kennedy-Johnson years and the Nixon-Ford
years than during the Eisenhower years.

However, even though each

interaction dummy variable is significantly different from zero,
a t-test revealed no significant difference in the magnitude of
the two coefficients.

That is, in a statistical sense, the coef

ficient on IIDEMO (.172) is not significantly larger than the
coefficient on IIREP2 (.123).18
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was
chaired by two different individuals in the time period covered by
this study - William McChesney Martin and Arthur M. Burns.

To test

whether a change in the chairmanship had an effect upon Federal
Reserve policy, a dummy variable consisting of 0's during Chairman
Martin's term and l's during Chairman Burns' term was added to the
reaction function.

However, the coefficient on this variable was

not statistically significant and this variable was dropped from
18

For a description of this statistical test, see Neter
and Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models, p. 309-10.
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the equation.

Thus the hypothesis of no significant difference in

policy due to the chairman was not rejected.
The short term interest rate in the previous quarter
is employed as a measure of the desired level of the short-term
interest rate.

Financial market stability is defined here as the

absence of large quarter-to-quarter movements in the short-term
interest rate.

Large fluctuations in this rate would be avoided

if the current rate were equal to or close to in magnitude the
previous quarter's short term rate.
desired short-term rate.

19

Hence i™ ^ is employed as the

Since financial market stability is

primarily a concern of the Federal Reserve and thus differs from
the macroeconomic goals that the Federal Reserve shares with the
fiscal authorities (here represented by the gaps between actual
and desired real output, actual and desired inflation, and actual
and desired states of the balance of trade), it is felt that tests
of varying response by the Federal Reserve to the financial market
stability goal across political administrations.are not supported
by a priori considerations.

Thus empirical tests of political

interaction effects are not made for this variable.
The coefficient on i™ ^ from the theoretical model is
(W3j 3)/(Wljl + W 2

j

2

+ W 3j3 +

SlnCe j3 < °* the exP ected

•^Studies which have used i^_x as
desired rate of
interest include P. Derosa and G. Stern, "Monetary Control and the
Federal Funds Rate," Journal of Monetary Economics, 3, 2 (April
1977), p. 220 and R. T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogneiety of
Monetary Policy," Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2 (July 1974), p. 180.
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sign on im ^ is negative.

That is, an increase (decrease) in the

desired short-term rate induces a reduction (increase) in UBRt>
The estimated coefficient on i®

is negative (-.573) and is sta

tistically significant at the 5 percent level, thus conforming to
the theoretical expectation.
Since government programs like guideposts and wage and price
controls are designed to control the inflation rate, one might
expect the Federal Reserve to be more expansionary during periods
of guideposts or wage and price controls than it would be without
guideposts or controls, given the actual relation between aggregate
demand and capacity.

Under conditions of controls or guideposts,

Federal Reserve policymakers may feel less pressure to curtail any
expansion in reserves since the effects of an expansionary policy
upon the inflation rate will be muted, at least temporarily.

Thus,

given behavior by the Federal Reserve of the sort just described,
one expects positive coefficients on GP, WPC, and WPCAF.
The estimated coefficients on GP, WPC, and WPCAF are posi
tive thus conforming to the expected signs.

The coefficients on

WPC and WPCAF are significant at the 5 percent level, but the
coefficient on GP is not significantly different from zero.

Thus

we see that Federal Reserve behavior was significantly affected by
the wage and price controls but was not significantly affected by
the guideposts.
Estimation of the Federal Reserve reaction function provides
statistical evidence of the effect of fiscal policy upon the Federal
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Reserve's policy variable.

The reaction function specified and

estimated here indicates a good fit to the data (R^ = .998).

The

estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables are, in every
case, of the anticipated sign and are, with the exceptions of the
•D
coefficients on GP and Pt , statistically significant.

Expansionary

fiscal policy measured by an increase in federal expenditures or by
a cut in exogenous tax receipts is associated with an expansion in
UBRt , a relationship that is consistent with Federal Reserve accom
modation of expansionary fiscal policy in order to mitigate the
2 0

effects of fiscal policy upon the short-term interest rate. u

IV.

Estimated Fiscal Policy Effects Upon the Money Supply
The previous sections of this chapter have examined the

estimated structural equations of the macromodel.

The immediately

preceding section examined the reaction function for the Federal
Reserve and the effect of fiscal policy upon the monetary policy
variable.

The effect of fiscal policy upon UBRt represents only

one channel by which fiscal policy can affect the money supply.
Fiscal policy, by changing Y t and i^, affects private sector
21

behavior which in turn affects the money supply. x

^ T h e effect of the time path of
and
on the time
path of UBRt can be determined by the derivation of dynamic multi
pliers for G^ and t £ > ^ .
This derivation will be the subject of
future research by the author.
21

xFor a detailed description of this process, see Chapters
II and III of this study.
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The immediate response of the money supply to the fiscal
policy variables can be estimated by solving the simultaneous
system of equations for the reduced form money supply equation.
In order to compare the immediate response of Ml to the fiscal
variables when the Federal Reserve is treated as exogenous and
when the Federal Reserve is treated as endogenous, the reduced
form equations for both Model I and Model II will be analyzed.
These equations are presented in Table IV.
As noted earlier, the coefficients on the explanatory
variables in the reduced form equations are estimates of the
immediate effects - the impact multipliers - of these variables
on the dependent variable.

Thus from Table IV we see that for

Model I the impact multipliers for government expenditures and
exogenous tax receipts are .058 and -.015 respectively.
signs of these coefficients are as anticipated.

22

The

Thus an

increase in G£ of $1 billion leads to an increase in Ml of $.058
billion and a tax cut of $1 billion leads to an increase in Ml
of $.015 billion within the same quarter.

The change in the

money supply in this model stems solely from the private sector
response to the effects of fiscal policy on such variables as
Y. and i®.
L
t
2^See Chapter II, pp. 80-84 of this study.

Table IV
Reduced Form Money Supply Equations

Explanatory Variable
Constant

t F,EX

xt
rSL
Gt

KCAt

±l

t-

1

i^
t-

2

Ct-

1

dYt-l
It-

Model I

Model II

49.28

72.95

.058

.181

-.015

-.207

.058

.058

-.015

-.018

-.015

-.018

.058

.058

-.047

-.046

-.192

-.167

.042

.039

. 0 0 1

. 0 1 1

.040

.040

-.056

-.056

1.663

1.620

-2.895

-2.840

1

IHt_i
•E
pt
TDS
t
UBR.
t
RYHfc
•D
Pt
IIDEMO
IIREP2

GP
WPC
WPCAF

5.566

—

—

.017

—

.284

—
—

.959
. 6 8 6

—

-3.194

—
—
—

.268
1.906
3.249
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The Impact multipliers for GE and
.181 and -.207, respectively.

from Model II are

A $1 billion increase in GE leads

to an increase in Ml of $.181 billion and a cut in

te

»e x leads to

an expansion in Ml of $.207 billion within the same quarter.
A comparison of the impact multipliers for Models I and II
reveals a substantial difference in the size of these multipliers
for both GE and TE,EX, even though (with one exception) statistical
test revealed no significant difference in the size of the struc
tural coefficients for the equations common to both models.

The

size difference stems from the inclusion of the Federal Reserve
reaction function in Model II.

In Model II the change in the

money supply is a result of changes in UBRt from Federal Reserve
response to the state of fiscal policy and private sector response
both to the state of fiscal policy and to changes in the monetary
policy variable.
Thus we have seen that analysis of the response of the
money supply to the state of fiscal policy requires consideration
of Federal Reserve reaction to fiscal policy.

Ignoring Federal

Reserve response to fiscal policy and its economic effects leads
one to underestimate the effect of fiscal policy upon the money
supply within the same quarter.

Assuming that the reaction

function employed here is correctly specified, we find that the
impact multiplier for G£ from the model without the reaction
function is .058, a value substantially lower than the "true"
impact multiplier of .181 from the model with the reaction
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function.

The same relationship is found for

These

results should be useful to fiscal policymakers in designing
countercyclical fiscal policy.
F

If these policymakers ignore
F F.y

Federal Reserve response to G£ and T**

in the design of fiscal

policy, the resulting fiscal policy may prove to be overly
stimulative in the case of expansionary fiscal policy and overly
contractionary in the case of contractionary fiscal policy.

V.

Conclusion
The estimation of two structural models and the Federal

Reserve reaction function has been analyzed in this chapter.

It

was seen that the estimated structural coefficients for both
Model I (Federal Reserve exogenous) and Model II (Federal Reserve
endogenous) were of the anticipated sign and were, with the excep
tion of the coefficients on GP and WPC in the inflation equation,
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

Consideration

-O
of the R^s for the estimated equations indicated reasonably good
fits to the data.

Furthermore, t-tests led to the conclusion

that (with one exception - RADt) there were no significant dif
ferences (again at the 5 percent•level) in magnitude between the
estimated parameters in the equations common to both Models I
and I I .

2 3

OO
■
“ Goldfeld and Blinder note that in principle misspecifying
policy variables as exogenous when they are in fact endogenous may
result in inconsistent estimates of structural parameters.
However,
they point out that as a practical matter this misspecification as
exogenous may not significantly affect the structural parameter
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The estimated reaction function suggests that the Federal
Reserve systematically reacts to the state of the economy.

The

basis of this systematic reaction is Federal Reserve concern with
macroeconomic stabilization goals and with financial market stability.
Of immediate concern to this study is the significant relationship
between fiscal policy variables and the monetary policy variable.
Furthermore, given the structure of the economy and the loss function
specified in this study, the signs of the coefficients on the fiscal
variables, in the reaction function, positive on

F Fy

T *

and negative on

, imply that the Federal Reserve weights concern for financial

market stability relatively more than macroeconomic stabilization
goals in its shprt-term response to fiscal policy.
The results presented in this chapter support the contention
that unborrowed reserves are endogenous.

Since unborrowed reserves

are endogenous, it must also be concluded that the money supply is
endogenous.

Treatment of unborrowed reserves and the money supply

as exogenous thus results in misspecification of the model.

While

this particular misspecification may not drastically alter the

estimates because in a structural model the misspecified policy
variables are generally small in number relative to the total
number of lagged endogenous and exogenous variables.
Furthermore,
only a few equations may be seriously affected since the policy
variables generally appear in only a few equations. Using the
Moroney-Mason model, Goldfeld and Blinder found no serious esti
mation biases for the structural parameters when a variable that
was endogenous was incorrectly treated as exogenous.
See S. M.
Goldfeld and A. S. Blinder, "Some Implications of Endogenous
Stabilization Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3
(1972), pp. 588-9 and 613-7.
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estimates of the structural parameters of the model, it will bias
the estimated multipliers for monetary and fiscal policy variables.^
Thus we saw that the impact multipliers for GE and xE,EX in the
reduced form equation for Ml from Model I severly underestimated
the "true" impact multipliers for

v

g£

F EX
and T t ’
when unborrowed

reserves are endogenous.^
It is thus important for fiscal policymakers to be cognizant
of the systematic reaction of the Federal Reserve to the state of
the economy.

Fiscal policy formulated without regard to this syste

matic reaction may result in overly expansionary or contractionary
fiscal policy.

^Goldfeld and Blinder, "Some Implications," pp. 617-21.
^ T h e derivation of dynamic multipliers for GE and t E,EX
for Ml will be the subject of future research by the author.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The major purpose of this study is to analyze the theo
retical linkages between fiscal policy and the money supply and to
empirically estimate the effect of fiscal policy upon the money
supply.

The theoretical linkages are analyzed within the context

of a linear variant of the IS-LM model that incorporates endogenous
taxes, inflationary expectations, and budget constraints for both
the monetary and fiscal authorities into the structure of the model.
The empirical estimates of the effects of fiscal policy upon the
money supply are obtained by estimating a version of the IS-LM model
which contains a reaction function for the monetary authority.
In deriving the theoretical linkages, the monetary authority
is viewed as minimizing a static quadratic loss function subject to
its perception of the structure of the economy.

The loss function

contains as arguments the weighted squared deviations of actual from
desired values for real output, the inflation rate, the balance of
trade, and the short-term interest rate.

The first three arguments

in the loss function are measures of macroeconomic stabilization
goals pursued by the monetary authority.

The IS-LM model specified

in this study is assumed to be an acceptable proxy for the structure
of the economy perceived by the monetary authority.
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Solution of the monetary authority's optimization problem
leads to specification of a reaction function for the monetary
authority.

This reaction function relates the monetary policy

variable to the lagged endogenous and exogenous variables of the
model and to the desired values of the arguments in the loss function.
Specification of the reaction function permits analysis of the
effects of fiscal policy upon the monetary policy variable since the
fiscal policy variables (.federal government purchases of goods and
services and exogenous federal net tax receipts) are exogenous vari
ables .

The anticipated effects of fiscal policy upon the policy

variable can be analyzed by examining the fiscal variable coeffi
cients in the reaction function.

These coefficients are complex

mixtures of the weights in the loss function and the structural
parameters of the model.
Analysis of the fiscal variable coefficients in the reaction
function leads to the conclusion that the coefficients on federal
government expenditures and on exogenous federal net taxes will be
positive and negative, respectively, if the weight on financial
market stability exceeds a weighted sum of the weights on the macroeconomic stabilization goals, given traditionally accepted signs on
the structural coefficients.

Thus, if this weight pattern holds,

an expansionary fiscal policy will induce an expansion in the policy
variable within the same quarter.

That is, with this weight

pattern, the monetary authority will accommodate an expansionary
fiscal policy by increasing the policy variable.
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The effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply are then
analyzed by solving the structural model with the reaction function
for the reduced form money supply equation and examining the fiscal
variable coefficients in this equation.

The signs of these coeffi

cients depend upon the reaction of the monetary authorities to fiscal
policy and upon the effects of fiscal policy upon output and interest
rates.

Accommodation of expansionary fiscal policy by the monetary

authority is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the reduced
form coefficients on expenditures and net taxes to be positive and
negative, respectively.

That is, if the monetary authority accom

modates expansionary fiscal policy, the reduced form coefficients on
expenditures and net tax receipts must be positive and negative,
respectively.

However, even if the monetary authority is not accom

modating, the reduced form coefficients could still be positive and
negative, respectively, if the expansionary fiscal policy offsets
the induced contraction in the monetary policy variable and raises
output and demand sufficiently.

In terms of money demand and supply,

if the net effect of the combined expansionary fiscal policy and
the induced contraction in the monetary policy variable is to shift
the money demand curve to the right more than the money supply shifts
to the left, the quantity of money will rise.
To empirically test the direction of effect of fiscal policy
upon the monetary policy variable and the money supply, the IS-LM
model with the derived reaction function is estimated utilizing
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iterative three-stage least squares.

The estimated reaction

function provides strong evidence that the monetary policy variable,
unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve requirement changes, is
endogenous; that is, the monetary authority systematically reacts
to the movement of economic variables.

Thus models that treat the

policy variable as exogenous are misspecified, although the mis
specification may not have serious consequences for the estimation
of the other structural equations.
The estimated coefficients on federal expenditures and
exogenous federal net tax receipts in the reaction function are
positive and negative, respectively.

The signs of these coefficients

imply that the monetary authority weights financial market stability
more heavily than the macroeconomic stabilization goals.

Thus in

the period covered by the estimation, 1953:01-1976:04, the Federal
Reserve accommodated expansionary fiscal policy, thereby rein
forcing the effect of fiscal policy upon the economy.

However, it

should be noted that while within the same quarter financial market
stability seems to dominate other goals, Federal Reserve behavior
is significantly influenced by these other goals.

The coefficient

on real high employment GNP is of the anticipated sign and statis
tically significant.

The coefficient on the desired inflation rate

is of the anticipated sign but is not statistically significant.
However, the significant coefficients on the interaction dummy vari
ables for the desired inflation rate suggest that Federal Reserve
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response to the desired inflation rate varied significantly with
the particular political administration, thus indicating some
interaction between the varying attitudes toward macroeconomic
stabilization goals introduced by a change in presidental admini
strations and Federal Reserve reaction to these stabilization goals.
The effect of fiscal policy upon the money supply is
analyzed by solving the estimated system of equations for the
reduced form money supply equation.

The coefficients on the fiscal

variable in this equation reveal the immediate effect of these vari
ables upon the money supply.

Thus these coefficients can be

interpreted as impact multipliers for the fiscal variables.

Since

the signs of the coefficients in the estimated reaction function
imply accommodation of fiscal policy, -the expected signs on federal
expenditures and exogenous net taxes in the reduced form equation
are unambiguously positive and negative, respectively.

Solution

of the reduced form money supply equation reveals that the coef
ficients on these variables are indeed positive and negative,
respectively.

Thus an increase in federal expenditures is asso

ciated with a same quarter increase in the money supply; the impact
multiplier for expenditures is .181.

A reduction in exogenous tax

receipts is also associated with a same quarter increase in the
money supply; the impact multiplier for taxes is -.207.
The results outlined above are derived from the model with
the Federal Reserve endogenous (Model II ) .

To determine the effect

upon the money supply impact multipliers for the fiscal policy
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variables when the Federal Reserve's policy instrument is mis
takenly viewed as exogenous,

the reduced form money supply

equation was derived from the model estimated without a reaction
function for the monetary authority (Model I ) .

Even though the

forms of the equations in Model I are identical to Model II and
the estimated coefficients are not significantly different (with
one exception), the money supply impact multipliers differ con
siderably.

In Model I the impact multiplier for federal expenditures

is estimated as .058 and the impact multiplier for federal net taxes
is estimated as -.015.

These multipliers reflect only private

sector response to the fiscal variables, but the multipliers for
the model with the Federal Reserve endogenous reflect both private
sector and Federal Reserve response to fiscal policy.

One con

cludes that failure to consider the response of the Federal Reserve
to fiscal policy leads to underestimating the effects of fiscal
variables upon the money supply.
This study thus shows that mistakenly treating the Federal
Reserve as exogenous does not significantly affect the estimated
parameters in the structural model but does significantly affect the
estimates of the effect of fiscal policy upon the money supply.
Thus unless fiscal policymakers take into account the response of
monetary policymakers to their actions, fiscal policy designed to
counter a recession may be overstimulative or fiscal policy designed
to counter inflation may be overly contractionary.

Furthermore,

as noted by Goldfeld and Blinder, an outside observer who attempts
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to assess the effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply or upon
other endogenous variables will misestimate these effects unless the
reaction function for the monetary authority is explicitly
considered.^Finally, it should be noted that the results of this study
should be taken as indicative but not definitive estimates of the
effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply.

The results presented

in this paper are conditioned upon the proper specification of the
loss function for the monetary authority and upon the proper speci
fication of the structure of the economy perceived by the monetary
authority.

Specification of a multi-period loss function or employ

ment of a large scale econometric model may modify the estimates
presented here, although the estimates of the impact multipliers
of fiscal policy upon the money supply are not altered drastically
when different fiscal variables are employed in the reaction function.
However, it should be noted that the one-period loss function used
here is widely employed in reaction function studies and the model
estimated here, although linear, is similar in nature to an econometric model employed by the Federal Reserve in policy determination.

2

^S. M. Goldfeld and A. S. Blinder, "Some Implications of
Endogenous Stabilization Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 3 (1972), p. 623. Goldfeld and Blinder note that policy
multipliers may be seriously misestimated.
The examination of,fiscal
multipliers for other endogenous variables such as Y, im , and P in the
estimated model will be the subject of future research by the author.

2

See for example, J. L. Pierce, "Quantitative Analysis for
Decisions at the Federal Reserve," Annals of Economic and Social
Measurement, 3, 1 (1974), pp. 11-19.
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APPENDIX ONE
MATRIX DERIVATION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
POLICY REACTION FUNCTION

In matrix form the loss function can be written as:

A = (Yt - Y J ) lW(Yt-Y*)

where
Y

= 4 x 1 vector of actual values of the arguments in the loss
function

Y* = 4 x 1 vector of desired values of the arguments in the loss
function
and
W

= 4 x 4

diagonal matrix of weights in the loss function.

Yt =

-

Y "
d(p^)
t

dy*

dP

dP*
t

t

Y* =
L

dBTt
di*
—
_

•
>

0

0

w„

; and

0

0

0

0

0

Y t=JRt+HZt

where
Rt = 1 x 1 vector of the Federal Reserve policy variable,
J

= 4 x 1

vector of coefficients on the policy variable,

H

= 4 x 12 matrix of coefficients on the exogenous and lagged
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W3

_

The structure of the economy can be written as:

endogenous variables, and

0

2

w =

dBT*
t
di“*

0

W 1
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Zj. =

x

1 2

vector of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables.

1

These matrices are given by:
Rt = [dUBRj,
lxl

*4
4x1
where
A2

25

(—

An

2 „POT
lt-l

)

11
J3

= "C1 A

J4

~ ~ A

21

A 25 " (Y^P t-l*P t-lJ2
and A 2 » A 11? and A 2

1

are as defined in Chapter Three,
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C 1

and all other terms are as previously defined in this chapter and
in Chapter Three.
As noted in the text of Chapter Four, the solution to the
minimization problem is given by:
R

U

= [J'WJJ^J'WY* - [J'WJ]"1 J'WHZ .
L
L

Performance of the necessary matrix algebra yields the policy
reaction function given in the text:

APPENDIX TWO
DATA APPENDIX

I.

Product Sector and Inflation Equation Data
General Comments:

All data are in current dollars unless other
wise specified and are seasonally adjusted
at annual rates.

The following data were collected from the January 1976 and
subsequent issues of the Survey of Current Business.

Y

= Gross National Product,

(billions of dollars)

C

= Personal Consumption Expenditures, Durables and Nondurables,
(billions of dollars)

I

= Gross Private Domestic Investment! (billions

of dollars)

E

= Exports,

IM

= Imports, (billions of dollars)

KCA

= Capital Consumption Allowances,

q F,T

_ Total Federal Government Expenditures,

qF

= Federal Government Expenditures on Goods and Services,

(billions of dollars)

(billionsof dollars)
(billions of dollars)

(billions of dollars)
rjiSL,T

_ Total Receipts, State and Local Governments,

(billions of

dollars)
GS L >T

= Transfer Payments (Including Net Interest Paid), State and
Local Government,

(billions of dollars)

(jF,GIA = Federal Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Government,
(billions of dollars)
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FDEF

= Federal Government Deficit, National Income and Product
Accounts, (billions of dollars)

DIV

= Net Dividend Payments,(billions of dollars)

£

= Percent Change in Implicit GNP Deflator
The following data were supplied by the Research Division of

the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

YH

= Nominal Potential GNP, New CEA Estimates, (billions of dollars)

RYH

= Real Potential GNP, New CEA Estimates,(billions of dollars)

ENCEA

= High-Employment Federal Expenditures, New CEA Estimates,
(billions of dollars)

RNCEA

= High-Employment Federal Receipts, New CEA Estimates,
(billions of dollars)
The following data were collected from the Treasury Bulletin,

various issues.

INTGN

= Interest Payments to the Public on Federal Debt, Not
Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of dollars)

VE1

= Short-Term Federal Debt as Proportion of Total Federal
Debt,

WE2

(percentage)

= Long-Term Federal Debt as Proportion of Total Federal
Debt,

(percentage)

Specific Comments:

Other variables employed in the study were con

structed from the data listed above.
variables will now be discussed.

The construction of these
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Net taxes for state and local governments were derived by
subtracting state and local transfer payments (GSL,T) and federal
grants-in-aid to state and local governments

from total

receipts for state and local governments (TSL,T).
Net federal taxes were generated by first generating a time
series for total federal receipts.

Total federal receipts were ob

tained by adding total federal expenditures (G*’’'*-) to the federal
deficit (FDEF).

Net tax receipts were obtained by subtracting trans

fer payments (generated by subtracting federal purchase of goods and
services (G^) from G ^ ’^) from total federal receipts.
These net tax measures along with KCA were used to generate
personal disposable income (YD).

To derive YD, KCA, net taxes for

state and local governments, and net taxes for the federal govern
ment were subtracted from GNP(Y).
Seasonally adjusted federal interest payments to the public
on federal debt were obtained by seasonally adjusting INTGN with
the Census Bureau’s X-ll seasonal adjustment program.
Measures of exogenous and endogenous federal net taxes were
derived in the manner outlined in Chapter IV.
Private net wealth (NW) was then derived in the manner out
lined in Chapter IV.
Descriptions of the construction of the aggregate demand
proxy (RAD), the expected rate of inflation (P ) and the dummy vari
ables WPC, WPCAF, and GP are presented in Chapter IV.

II.

Monetary Sector

Data

The following data were collected from Banking and Monetary
Statistics (Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System), Annual Sta
tistical Digest (Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System), and the
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
M
i

= Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate (Market Yield), (percentage)

i

= Long-Term Government Security Rate, (percentage)

i°S

_ DiSC0Unt Rate, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,

M

C

= Ml, Current Dollar, Seasonally Adjusted,

(percentage)

(billions of

dollars)
The following data were obtained from the Research Division
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

All data are in current

dollars.

MB

= Source Base (Monetary Base Unadjusted for Reserve Require
ment Changes), Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of dollars)

SBN

= Source Base, Not Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of dollars)

BRN

= Member Bank Borrowings from the Federal Reserve, Not
Seasonally Adjusted,

CN

(billions of dollars)

= Currency Held by the Public, Not Seasonally Adjusted,
(billions of dollars)

RAM

= Reserve Adjustment Magnitude,

(billions of dollars)
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Specific Comments;

Other variables employed in this study were con

structed from the data listed above.

The construction of these vari

ables will now be discussed.
A seasonally adjusted time series for unborrowed reserves
adjusted for reserve requirement changes (UBR) was constructed in
the following manner.

Unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve

requirement changes (not seasonally adjusted) were generated by
subtracting CN and BRN from SBN and adding RAM to this result.

This

time series was then seasonally adjusted with the X-ll program to
obtain UBR.
The dummy variables IIDEMO and IIREP2 and the Federal
•n

Reserve's desired rate of inflation (P ) were constructed in the
manner described in Chapter IV.
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